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Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online 
Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised 




¶1 In September 2009, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued a final consent 
order in the matter of Sears Holdings Management Corp. (“Sears”) regarding the FTC’s 
charges that Sears violated Section 5 of the FTC Act1 in connection with a software 
application it offered as part of its “My SHC Community Program.”2
¶2  In most respects, Sears did what nearly fifteen years of legal decisions, with only 
a few exceptions, have indicated make an enforceable online contract and privacy policy, 
namely, that the consumer is given a reasonable opportunity to review the terms of the 
agreement and that the user indicates assent to the agreement.
  The software 
application (the “Tracking Application”) allowed Sears to track consumers’ online 
behavior, as well as some offline activities.  When installed, the Tracking Application ran 
in the background on consumers’ computers and transmitted tracked information to 
servers maintained on behalf of Sears.  Information collected and transmitted included all 
of the consumers’ web browsing (not just on Sears’ sites), online purchases, business 
transacted during secure sessions, completion of online application forms, online 
checking accounts, and some of the consumers’ web-based email and instant messages. 
3  For example, Sears 
included a Privacy Statement and User License Agreement (“PSULA”) that described the 
Tracking Application in detail,4
 
* Practitioner, Denver, Colorado, B.A., UCLA; M.S., Drexel University College of Information Science; 
J.D., State University of New York at Buffalo. I appreciate the helpful comments of Eric Goldman, 
Katherine Strandburg, Lee Tien, and Rebecca Tushnet. © 2009 by Susan E. Gindin 
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (2006). 
2 Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm.  The final consent order was issued on September 9, 
2009.  On June 4, 2009, the FTC announced that Sears agreed to enter into a settlement. Press Release, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding Tracking Software (June 4, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/sears.shtm. The FTC also announced the agreement in the Federal 
Register and opened the matter to public comment.  The four comments that the FTC received are available 
on the FTC website at http://www.ftc.gov/os/publicomments.shtm. 
3 See infra Part III, for a review of court decisions regarding digital contracts.  
4 The description of the functions of the Tracking Application in the PSULA read:  
Computer hardware, software, and other configuration information: Our application may 
collect certain basic hardware, software, computer configuration and application usage 
information about the computer on which you install our application, including such data 
as the speed of the computer processor, its memory capacities and Internet connection 
speed. In addition, our application may report on devices connected to your computer, 
such as the type of printer or router you may be using. 
  and before a consumer could install the Tracking 
Application, the consumer was required to check a box stating: 
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I am the authorized user of this computer and I have read, agree to, and have 
obtained the agreement of all computer users to the terms and conditions of the 
Privacy Statement and User License Agreement. 
¶3 The Sears action was alarming in some respects in light of the long line of legal 
decisions upholding online contracts.  Furthermore, as later discussed, it raises many 
questions regarding digital contracting, notice and consent, privacy, and advertising in the 
digital marketplace, which includes transactions via the Internet, mobile devices, and 
other digital platforms.5
A. Where Did Sears Go Wrong? 
   
¶4  For years courts have upheld numerous online contracts against consumers.  
However, the FTC’s enforcement action against Sears (the “Sears Matter” or “Sears 
Action”) raises questions as to what is different about the Sears PSULA that would cause 
the FTC to bring an enforcement action. 
¶5 First, it is important to note that the FTC enforcement action did not question 
whether the PSULA was enforceable, rather the FTC questioned whether Sears’ actions 
were unfair or deceptive.  Under the FTC Act, the FTC is charged with protecting 
consumers against unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.6
 
 
Internet usage information:  Once you install our application, it monitors all of the 
Internet behavior that occurs on the computer on which you install the application, 
including both your normal web browsing and the activity that you undertake during 
secure sessions, such as filling a shopping basket, completing an application form or 
checking your online accounts, which may include personal financial or health 
information. We may use the information that we monitor, such as name and address, for 
the purpose of better understanding your household demographics; however we make 
commercially viable efforts to automatically filter confidential personally identifiable 
information such as UserID, password, credit card numbers, and account numbers. 
Inadvertently, we may collect such information about our panelists; and when this 
happens, we make commercially viable efforts to purge our database of such information. 
 
The software application also tracks the pace and style with which you enter 
information online (for example, whether you click on links, type in webpage names, or 
use shortcut keys), the usage of cookies, and statistics about your use of online 
applications (for example, it may observe that during a given period of use of a computer, 
the computer downloaded X number of bytes of data using a particular Internet enabled 
gaming application). 
 
Please note:  Our application does not examine the text of your instant messages or e-
mail messages. We may, however, review select e-mail header information from web-
based e-mails as a way to verify your contact information and online usage information.  
 
Complaint at 4, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm. 
5 See infra Part I.B. regarding the questions raised by the enforcement action. 
6 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006). 
  At 
times, the FTC identifies the kinds of practices it finds objectionable by bringing 
enforcement actions that establish compliance requirements for companies to follow in 
avoiding similar actions being brought against them in the future.  Furthermore, as 
discussed in this Article, the FTC’s actions in the Sears Matter are consistent with many 
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years of FTC policy, statements, and enforcement actions regarding the necessity for 
online businesses and advertisers to provide key disclosures that are clear and 
conspicuous, or “transparent.”7
¶6 The essence of the FTC’s complaint is that Sears did not adequately disclose the 
actual functions of the Tracking Application and that a reasonable understanding of the 
functions would be material to consumers when deciding whether to participate in the 
SHC Community.  Sears’ disclosures regarding the Tracking Application came too late in 
the process.  First, consumers received extensive advertising material (including such 
enticements as “Get Advice Before You Buy,” “Join the Community.  It’s Free!,” “Talk 
to Us!  We’re Ready to Make Things Happen,” and “Connect With Others”) that did not 





7 In some respects, Sears is a victim of timing.  Although the FTC has indicated the need for providing 
disclosures transparently in the offline context at least since the 1970s and in the online context at least 
since 2000, the FTC made its emphasis on transparency in the online privacy context more clear beginning 
in 2007.  Sears offered the Tracking Application between April 2007 and January 2008 and therefore had 
already launched the Tracking Application when the FTC indicated its emphasis on transparency in online 
privacy disclosures. 
8 As alleged by the FTC, Sears presented the opportunity to download the application to visitors to the 
sears.com and kmart.com websites as an opportunity to join a “My SHC Community” through a pop-up 
box that said: 
 
Ever wish you could talk directly to a retailer? Tell them about the products, services and 
offers that would really be right for you? 
 
If you’re interested in becoming part of something new, something different, we’d like to 
invite you to become a member of My SHC Community. My SHC Community, 
sponsored by Sears Holdings Corporation, is a dynamic and highly interactive on-line 
community. It’s a place where your voice is heard and your opinion matters, and what 
you want and need counts! 
 
Complaint at 2, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm.  The pop-up advertisement did not mention the 
Application and neither did the general “Privacy Policy” statement which could be accessed via the 
hyperlink in the pop-up advertisement box.  Consumers indicated their interest by providing their email 
addresses, and the email response stated the following (this time with some mention of tracking): 
  
From shopping, current events, social networking, to entertainment and email, it seems 
that the Internet is playing a bigger and bigger role in our daily lives these days. 
 
If you’re interested in becoming part of something new, something different, we’d like to 
invite you to join a new and exciting online community; My SHC Community, sponsored 
by Sears Holdings Corporation. Membership is absolutely free! 
 
My SHC Community is a dynamic and highly interactive online community. It’s a place 
where your voice is heard and your opinion matters, and what you want and need counts! 
As a member of My SHC Community, you’ll partner directly with the retail industry. 
You’ll participate in exciting, engaging and on-going interactions – always on your terms 
and always by your choice. My SHC Community gives you the chance to help shape the 
future by sharing and receiving information about the products, services and offers that 
would really be right for you. 
  
  Sears also offered $10 to consumers who kept the Tracking 
To become a member of My SHC Community, we simply ask you to complete the 
registration process which includes providing us with your contact information as well as 
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Application on their computers for at least 30 days, making the opportunity even more 
enticing.  However, consumers did not have the opportunity to review the detailed 
description of the Tracking Application until they had taken multiple steps to register, 
and were then required to agree to the PSULA.  Even then, the description of the 
functions of the Tracking Application did not appear until approximately the 75th line in 
the PSULA9
Respondent failed to disclose adequately that the software application, when 
installed, would: monitor nearly all of the Internet behavior that occurs on 
consumers’ computers, including information exchanged between consumers and 
websites other than those owned, operated, or affiliated with respondent, 
information provided in secure sessions when interacting with third-party 
websites, shopping carts, and online accounts, and headers of web-based email; 
track certain non-Internet related activities taking place on those computers; and 
transmit nearly all of the monitored information (excluding selected categories of 
filtered information) to respondent’s remote computer servers. These facts would 
be material to consumers in deciding to install the software. Respondent’s failure 
to disclose these facts, in light of the representations made, was, and is, a 
deceptive practice. . . . The acts and practices of respondent as alleged in this 
complaint constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce in violation of Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
 which was presented to the consumer in a scroll box.  In the Complaint 
against Sears, the FTC alleged: 
10
B. Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the Enforcement Action 
 
¶7 Although the Sears enforcement action provides some important lessons for online 
businesses and advertisers, it also brings
 
answering a series of profile questions that will help us get to know you better. You’ll 
also be asked to take a few minutes to download software that is powered by (VoiceFive). 
This research software will confidentially track your online browsing. This will help us 
better understand you and your needs, enabling us to create more relevant future offerings 
for you, other community members, and eventually all shoppers. You can uninstall the 
software at any time through the Add/Remove program utility on your computer. 
 
During the registration process, you’ll learn more about this application software and 
you’ll always have the opportunity to ask any and every question you may have. 
 
Id. at 2-3; see also Ben Edelman, The Sears “Community” Installation of ComScore, Jan. 1, 2008, 
http://www.benedelman.org/news/010108-1.html (providing images of the advertising materials and 
PSULA acceptance process). Ben Edelman first called the matter to the FTC’s attention. See PC World, 
Researcher Accuses Sears of Spreading Spyware, ABC NEWS, Jan. 2, 2008, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/PCWorld/story?id=4074931. 
9 See note 4 for the description of the functions. 
10 Complaint at 5, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm. 
 uncertainty to electronic commerce.  This 
Article refers to various digital platforms, including the Internet and mobile devices, as 
“online.” 
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1. Lessons Learned 
¶8 First, the FTC enforcement action indicates the types of disclosures required when 
businesses and advertisers offer products online.  Terms which are likely material to 
consumers in deciding to participate in the service or order the product must be presented 
clearly and prominently.  It may not be enough to present consumers with online 
contracts (no matter how completely they describe the product or service) if the material 
terms have not been presented clearly, prominently, and in a meaningful manner. 
¶9 Second, with regard to online contracts and privacy notices, the Sears Action 
reflects a trend toward the requirement of shorter documents that are easier to read and 
understand.  This may be difficult for various reasons, including the need to address 
complex legal requirements and technical issues in such documents.  The FTC has 
experienced firsthand the difficulties of condensing online contracts and privacy notices.  
It has been part of several initiatives to find a notice format that consumers will read.  An 
example is its initiative with banking regulators to draft form financial privacy policies 
that comply with Gramm-Leach-Bliley requirements.11  As a result, it may be that a two-
tier privacy notice may become standard.  For example, in behavioral advertising, the 
FTC has recommended a two-tier approach for privacy notices with a brief initial notice 
to consumers, and with a link to a much more detailed document for consumers who want 
to learn more.12
¶10 
   
Third, regarding privacy notices, the Sears Action is a reminder that the FTC will 
require enhanced notice particularly in regard to the collection and use of “sensitive” 
personal information.13  As further discussed in Part V, although a definition of “sensitive 
data” has not yet been decided,14 the FTC has indicated that, before collecting sensitive 
data, companies must obtain affirmative express consent from consumers.  Affirmative 
express consent is also referenced as “opt-in,” where the consumer specifically chooses 
or agrees to allow certain uses of their personal information.  The opposite of opt-in is 
“opt out.”  An example is a pre-checked box or a statement where the company tells the 
consumer: “we’ll use your data in this manner, unless you tell us otherwise.”  In the Sears 
Matter, the FTC indicated that the crux of the issue was the inadequately disclosed 
collection of sensitive data (including bank account information).  The Decision and 
Order15
 
11 Financial Services Modernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09 (2006).  See 
FTC Privacy Initiatives, Financial Privacy Rule: Interagency Notice Research Project, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/financial_rule_inrp.html (last visited July 30, 2009). 
12 As further discussed in this article, some consumers do not seem to care about online privacy; witness 
the amount of highly personal data posted to social networking sites.  However, the FTC is concerned that 
consumers are unaware of the privacy considerations at stake—a situation which surely resulted in a case 
of the “consumer” being unaware that details posted to Facebook are not private. See Associated Press, The 
U.K. Spy Chief Who Loved Facebook, CBS NEWS, July 5, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/05/tech/main5135008.shtml. 
13 See infra Part V, for a discussion of the FTC’s particular scrutiny regarding collection of sensitive 
data and sharing data with third parties. 
14 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL 
ADVERTISING 42 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf 
[hereinafter 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report]. 
15 Decision and Order, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm.  See infra Part IV, for further details regarding 
the requirements of the Decision and Order. 
 required that Sears provide very detailed and specific disclosures to consumers 
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before installation of any future Tracking Application regardless of whether the collected 
information could contain personal, financial, or health information.16
¶11 Fourth, this enforcement action signals the FTC’s likely position in the current 
dialogue concerning whether or how behavioral advertising should be legislated.  The 
FTC defines behavioral advertising or tracking as “the tracking of a consumer’s online 
activities over time – including the searches the consumer has conducted, the web pages 
visited, and the content viewed – in order to deliver advertising targeted to the individual 
consumer’s interests.”
  
17  Although behavioral tracking has typically been reported to be 
anonymous, there are indications that information collected online is being combined 
with data collected offline.  For example, as reported by the New York Times, certain 
companies are combining information collected offline with data collected online, and 
using it to serve even more targeted advertising.18  Furthermore, according to the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, social networks like Facebook, MySpace and LinkedIn 
make it easy for tracking applications to associate cookie and other data with “true name” 
using various techniques.19  As these practices become more prevalent (or more 
publicized), extensive FTC scrutiny of the privacy policies of businesses that employ the 
services of such companies becomes more likely.  Companies that have historically used 
privacy policies stating “we will never share your personally identifiable information,” 
will need to be particularly careful to notify customers that their personally identifiable 
information will now be combined with data understood to be collected anonymously to 
serve more relevant advertising.20
¶12  Fifth, as to advertising disclosures, the Sears action serves as a reminder for 
advertisers about the necessity of providing effective disclosures to consumers.  
Advertising materials (and particularly those associated with the tracking of consumer 
personal data) should receive legal review to determine whether such materials comply 
with advertising legal requirements.  Furthermore, the Sears Matter signals that 
advertising materials should be reviewed together with the terms of online contracts and 
privacy policies associated with the advertising campaign.  Review will ensure that 
important disclosures are included clearly and conspicuously in advertising materials as 
well as in online contracts and/or privacy policies.  The Sears PSULA likely would not 
have concerned the FTC if the advertising materials presented to the consumer had 
clearly and prominently disclosed the functions of the Tracking Application early in the 
process.  As a practical matter, advertising is typically created shortly before its intended 
publication and lawyers are asked to review the advertising material under a tight time 
frame.  However, the FTC’s enforcement action will serve as a lesson that the 




17 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14, at 46. 
18 See Stephanie Clifford, Ads Follow Web Users, and Get More Personal, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/media/31privacy.html. 
19 Posting of Peter Eckersley to Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/09/online-trackers-and-social-networks (Sept. 21, 2009) (“How Online 
Tracking Companies Know Most of What You Do Online (and What Social Networks Are Doing to Help 
Them)”); see also Posting of Seth Schoen to Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/09/new-cookie-technologies-harder-see-and-remove-wide (Sept. 14, 
2009) (“New Cookie Technologies: Harder to See and Remove, Widely Used to Track You”). 
20 See infra Part VI, for more discussion of behavioral advertising including combining of personally 
identifiable information with the usually anonymous data collected online. 
Vol. 8:1] Susan E. Gindin 
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Sears was not fined by the FTC for its Tracking Application, the consequences of the 
enforcement action are considerable.  Under the Decision and Order,21 Sears has 
substantial reporting obligations to the FTC for four years, and is subject to steep fines if 
it violates the Decision and Order during the next twenty years.  Fines can be 
considerable in enforcement actions.22
¶13 Sixth, to some extent, the Sears Matter reflects a shift from the position that the 
consumer is legally responsible for his actions (and in fact has a duty to read legal 
documents
  Furthermore, even without a fine, dealing with an 
FTC enforcement action is very expensive, both in terms of legal expenses, and in time 
spent responding to FTC allegations. 
23) to a more protective position.  As discussed in this Article, studies show 
that the online consumer is impulsive and unlikely to consider the legal consequences of 
his or her online behavior.24  Although there are likely many reasons why consumers are 
so “click-happy” online, free and instantaneous availability of many online resources 
probably contributes to this impulsiveness.25  At the same time, the risk of blindly 
accepting online privacy notices has intensified because digital technologies enable 
companies to invisibly track consumers and amass huge amounts of consumer data 
without their knowledge.  Therefore, the FTC has signaled its commitment to increase its 
consumer protection efforts particularly in the behavioral tracking realm.26
¶14 Seventh, from a consumer standpoint, the action is an important lesson for 
consumers that their inattention to the “fine print” may sometimes have serious 
unforeseen consequences.  Sears’ advertising suggested consumers would be joining an 
“online community” when in fact the Tracking Application effectively gave Sears the 
means to monitor personal data including bank accounts and prescription drug 
information.  Similarly, people have inadvertently downloaded adware
 
27 along with free 
screensavers, games, and other utilities.28
 
21 Decision and Order, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm. 
22 For example, Zango agreed to settle its action with the FTC for $3 million. Zango, Inc., File No. 052 
3130 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523130/index.shtm. 
23 See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 432 (2002) (asserting that although e-commerce changes some of the dynamics of 
standard-form contracting in interesting and novel ways and presents some new challenges, these 
differences do not call for the development of a radically different legal regime); see also Kaustuv M. Das, 
Comment, Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Clickwrap and Browsewrap Agreements and the 
“Reasonably Communicated” Test, 77 WASH. L. REV. 481 (2002). 
24 See infra Part V, for a discussion of studies showing that consumers uniformly do not pay attention to 
disclosures. 
25 See generally Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 23 (suggesting many additional reasons why 
consumers do not pay attention to contracts, such as trust in the vendor). 
26 See Stephanie Clifford, Fresh Views at Agency Overseeing Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, at 
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/business/media/05ftc.html; Douglas MacMillan, The 
FTC Takes On Targeted Web Ads, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 2, 2009, 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2009/tc2009082_486167.htm. 
27 Wikipedia describes adware as “any software package which automatically plays, displays, or 
downloads advertisements to a computer after the software is installed on it or while the application is 
being used.” Wikipedia, Adware, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adware (last visited Aug. 6, 2009). 
  Still others have unwittingly duped their 
28 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, DirectRevenue LLC Settles FTC Charges, Will Give Up 
$1.5 Million in Ill-Gotten Gains for Unfair and Deceptive Adware Downloads (Feb. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/directrevenue.shtm (describing how DirectRevenue and its affiliates 
offered consumers free content and software, such as screensavers, games, and utilities, without disclosing 
adequately that downloading them would result in installation of adware which monitored consumers’ 
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friends into enabling an email scraping operation because they did not read the “fine 
print.”29
2. Questions Raised 
  As will be discussed, the FTC is pushing advertisers to include a consumer 
education component as part of their behavioral tracking initiatives.  However, at some 
point, consumers should slow down to read and understand the provided disclosures 
before taking action online.  After all, neither the clarity nor the prominence of the 
disclosures will matter if consumers are so anxious to partake in the online experience 
that they blindly click “I agree” to every offer. 
¶15 At the same time, the enforcement action also raises considerable questions.  First, 
the Sears action raises substantial uncertainty in conducting business online.  The result 
indicates online businesses must clearly and conspicuously disclose material terms, but it 
raises the question as to what terms are material (and therefore must be disclosed).  Also, 
not all disclosures can be presented first.  How does a company decide which disclosures 
to provide and in what order?  Furthermore, some online formats provide very little room 
for disclosures.  For example, it may be more difficult for companies to obtain effective 
consent from mobile device users. 
¶16 Second, as discussed in Part IV, the FTC’s requirements for any future Tracking 
Applications employed by Sears are very exacting and include stipulations that Sears 
provide certain detailed disclosures.  These disclosures must be provided to the consumer 
on a distinct page prior to the display of an end user license agreement, privacy policy, 
terms of use, or similar document.  The FTC has also placed similar requirements on 
other companies.30
¶17 Third, as discussed in Part VI, although behavioral advertising has been 
traditionally based on anonymous data, companies are reportedly using data which is a 
combination of personally identifiable information (“PII”) and 




Internet use in order to display targeted pop-up ads). 
29 An action was brought in July 2009 by the New York Attorney General against Tagged, a social 
networking site.  According to the Attorney General, Tagged “scrapes” contact information in visitors’ 
personal address books in order to send invitations to friends of the visitors, in emails disguised to make it 
appear as though a friend was inviting them to view personal photos. See Press Release, Office of the 
Attorney Gen., State of N.Y., Attorney General Cuomo Announces Legal Action Against Social 
Networking Site That Raided Email Address Books, Stole Identities, And Spammed Millions Of 
Americans (July 9, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/july/july9a_09.html; 
see also Alina Tugend, Typing In an E-Mail Address, and Giving Up Your Friends’ as Well, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 19, 2009, at B7, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/20/technology/internet/20shortcuts.html (describing the author’s 
experience with Tagged). 
30 See the extended discussion of this issue in infra Part II; Zango, Inc., File No. 052 3130 (Fed. Trade 
Comm’n Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523130/index.shtm. 
31 In fact, research has shown that there is really no such thing as non-personally identifiable information 
because nearly all so-called anonymized data can be linked to a particular person. See Paul Ohm, Broken 
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. ___ 
(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450006 (identifying 
the failures of “anonymization” of personal information); see also Susan E. Gindin, Lost and Found in 
Cyberspace: Informational Privacy in the Age of the Internet, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1153, 1170 (1997) 
(discussing the ways online users may be identified individually); Posting of Seth Schoen to Electronic 
Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/09/what-information-personally-
identifiable (Sept. 11, 2009) (“What Information is ‘Personally Identifiable’?”). 
 collected online to serve more relevant targeted 
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advertisements.  Especially in light of the FTC’s emphasis on clear and conspicuous 
notice with regard to behavioral tracking, what type of privacy notice will the FTC find 
acceptable for companies using such services?  Also, can notice and an opportunity to opt 
out be sufficient, or will companies be required to obtain express consent from consumers 
prior to such tracking?  The Sears Matter suggests companies will be required to obtain 
express consent. 
¶18 Fourth, as discussed in Part V, there is proposed legislation to regulate behavioral 
advertising, and the FTC seems increasingly likely to support such legislation.  Is the 
time appropriate for such legislation? 
¶19 Fifth, as discussed in Part V, studies show that consumers are unlikely to pay 
attention to any notices, from mortgage documents to privacy notices.  What form of 
notice is most apt to capture consumer attention so that they are effectively informed? 
¶20 This Article discusses the Sears Matter in light of the above learned “lessons” and 
questions raised.  Part II discusses FTC policy and previous enforcement actions and 
statements; Part III reviews the enforceability of clickwrap agreements generally; Part IV 
focuses on the requirements for online disclosures, consents, and notices in light of the 
Sears Matter; and Part V focuses on privacy notices.  Part VI of this Article examines the 
behavioral advertising dialogue and the effect of the Sears Matter, the fact that Congress 
is discussing legislation with more urgency, and the measures taken by the industry to 
address various behavioral advertising concerns.  Finally, although it is very important 
that behavioral tracking be regulated in some manner, this Articles concludes that 
legislation is premature at this time and should be postponed at least for a few years to 
give self-regulatory principles a chance to work.32
II. THE SEARS ENFORCEMENT ACTION IS CONSISTENT WITH FTC POLICY AND WITH THE 
FTC’S PREVIOUS ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
 
¶21 As noted, the Sears enforcement action is consistent with FTC policy and with the 
FTC’s previous enforcement actions, statements, and guidelines.  The FTC has long 
required that businesses clearly and conspicuously disclose material facts.  The agency 
has maintained that an act or practice is deceptive and therefore a violation of the FTC 
Act if it is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and is 
“material,” that is, important to a consumer’s decision to buy or use the product.33
¶22 What’s more, the extensive tracking conducted by the Tracking Application raises 
consumer online privacy issues.  The FTC took a very early role in online consumer 
protection and privacy issues, beginning with a workshop on consumer information 




32 In this Article, I use the terms “privacy policy” and “privacy notice” interchangeably, and I also use 
the terms “behavioral advertising,” “behavioral marketing,” “behavioral tracking,” and “targeted 
marketing” interchangeably. 
33 FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTION (1983), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. 
34 FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1996), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. 
 and with workshops, “town halls,” reports, statements, and 
enforcement actions on privacy issues every year thereafter.  
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¶23 In 2000, the FTC issued Dot Com Disclosures,35
[p]lac[ing] disclosures near, and when possible, on the same screen as the 
triggering claim.  Use text or visual cues to encourage consumers to scroll down 
a Web page when it is necessary to view a disclosure. . . . 
 important guidelines for online 
businesses and advertisers conducting business online.  Dot Com Disclosures is a detailed 
tutorial regarding what makes advertising acceptable in an online setting, and a review is 
helpful in understanding the reasons the FTC took action against Sears.  The primary 
focus of the tutorial is that all disclosures to consumers must be clear and conspicuous, 
and it provides a lengthy list of actions advertisers should take to ensure that disclosures 
are clear and conspicuous, including 
In evaluating whether disclosures are likely to be clear and conspicuous in online 
ads, advertisers should consider the placement of the disclosure in an ad and its 
proximity to the relevant claim. Additional considerations include: the 
prominence of the disclosure; whether items in other parts of the ad distract 
attention from the disclosure; whether the ad is so lengthy that the disclosure 
needs to be repeated; . . . and, whether the language of the disclosure is 
understandable to the intended audience.36
Along with publication of Dot Com Disclosures, the FTC further emphasized its policy 
regarding online disclosures by holding multiple and repeated workshops entitled Green 




¶24 Following publication of Dot 
 
Com Disclosures and presentation of the Green 
Lights workshops, the FTC also indicated concern that online businesses and advertisers 
have not been making online disclosures clear and conspicuous.  For example, in January 
2007, the FTC held a Workshop on Negative Options38
[F]ace challenges in getting consumers to see and read their disclosures. The 
panelists revealed that many online consumers exhibit certain characteristics, 
including inattention, unwarranted confidence, exuberance, and a desire for 
immediate gratification, which make them less likely to see and read disclosures. 
Panelists further explained that, as result of these online characteristics, 
consumers become “click-happy” and quickly navigate through webpages, 
 in which commentators indicated 
that traditional means of making disclosures and obtaining consumer acceptance of 
online terms may not be enough.  At the Negative Options Workshop, commentators 
from the UC Berkeley School of Information presented results of a survey concluding 
that online vendors: 
 
35 FED. TRADE COMM’N, DOT COM DISCLOSURES: INFORMATION ABOUT ONLINE ADVERTISING (2000), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/ecommerce/bus41.pdf [hereinafter Dot Com 
Disclosures]. 
36 Id. at 1. 
37 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Green Lights & Red Flags: FTC Rules of the Road for Advertisers, 
http://www.ftc.gov/greenlights (last visited Oct. 21, 2009). 
38 A “negative option” is any provision under which the consumer’s silence or failure to take an 
affirmative action to reject goods or services or to cancel the agreement is interpreted by the seller as 
acceptance of the offer. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(t) (2009). 
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without paying much attention because they believe nothing will go wrong and 
want to complete the transaction as rapidly as possible. As a result, consumers 
often do not read or understand the terms of the agreements they accept. To 
combat consumers’ exuberance and inattention, the panelists recommended using 
short notices that include only the information material to consumers.39




¶25 In addition, the FTC brought enforcement actions against online businesses based 
partly on inadequate disclosure of material terms, including two which involved 
behavioral tracking software.  In 2006, the FTC brought an action against Zango, Inc.,
 
41 
and in 2007, the FTC brought an action against DirectRevenue42 alleging that the 
companies offered consumers free content and software—such as screensavers, games, 
and utilities—without adequately disclosing that downloading the software would result 
in simultaneous installation of adware which monitored consumers’ Internet use in order 
to display targeted pop-up ads.  Zango settled with the FTC for $3 million43 and 
DirectRevenue settled for $1.5 million.44
¶26 However, as next discussed, while the FTC has become increasingly active in 
requiring that companies provide conspicuous notice of material terms, the courts have 
almost unanimously enforced online contracts against consumers, even those with so-
called “hidden terms.”  
 
III. CLICKWRAP AGREEMENTS 
Has this happened to you? You plunk down a pretty penny for the latest and 
greatest software, . . . click on “install” and, after scrolling past a license 
agreement which would take at least fifteen minutes to read, find yourself staring 
at the following dialog box:  “I agree.”  Do you click on the box?  You probably 
do not agree in your heart of hearts, but you click anyway, not about to let some 
pesky legalese delay the moment for which you’ve been waiting. Is that 
“clickwrap” license agreement enforceable? Yes, at least in the case described 
below . . . .45
 
39 FED. TTRADE COMM’N, NEGATIVE OPTIONS: A REPORT BY THE STAFF OF THE FTC’S DIVISION OF 
ENFORCEMENT ii-iii (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02/P064202negativeoptionreport.pdf. 
40 Id. 
41 Zango, Inc., File No. 052 3130 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Nov. 3, 2006), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523130/index.shtm. 
42 DirectRevenue LLC, File No. 052 3131 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Feb. 16, 2007), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523131/index.shtm. 
43 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Zango, Inc. Settles FTC Charges, Will Give Up $3 Million in Ill-
Gotten Gains for Unfair and Deceptive Adware Downloads (Nov. 3, 2006), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/11/zango.shtm. 
44 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, DirectRevenue LLC Settles FTC Charges, Will Give Up $1.5 
Million in Ill-Gotten Gains for Unfair and Deceptive Adware Downloads (Feb. 16, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/directrevenue.shtm. 
45 i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002).  This case 
involved two businesses but the court’s reference to his personal experience with “pesky legalese” that 
delays the installation of his software is apt. 
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¶27 The above quote from a 2002 Massachusetts case exemplifies the rulings in most of 
the cases which have reviewed contracts, like the Sears PSULA, for electronic products.  
Generally such contracts, which are referred to as “clickwrap” agreements,46 have been 
found enforceable if the online business can demonstrate the consumer has had 
reasonable notice of the terms and the consumer has assented to the terms.47
¶28 One of the first judicial decisions regarding an electronic contract was ProCD, Inc. 
v. Zeidenberg,
 
48 decided by Judge Easterbrook on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in 1996.  Although it involved the acquisition of physical software, the decision 
set important principles for electronic agreements.49  First, it acknowledged the 
enforceability of electronic contracts with standardized terms, where the user agrees by 
clicking on a box labeled “I agree” or something similar.50  The court reasoned that since 
the defendant inspected the package, tried out the software, learned of the license, and did 
not reject the goods in accordance with the seller’s proposed contract (which the buyer 
accepts by using the software after having an opportunity to read the license), the 
shrinkwrap license was valid under U.C.C. § 2-204(1), and the defendant had agreed to 
the terms when he did not reject the product (as provided in U.C.C. § 2-606).51  Further, 
Judge Easterbrook indicated that the pop-up presentation type of clickwrap terms 
constitutes reasonable notice of the terms.52
¶29 The first case involving an actual clickwrap agreement was also decided in 1996.  
In CompuServe v. Patterson,
  With this foundation, courts following 
ProCD have regarded clickwrap terms as equivalent to terms in boilerplate paper 
contracts, and have upheld most of the clickwrap agreements which have been 
challenged. 
53 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that 
uploading shareware onto a computer subjects the user to the jurisdiction where the 
computer is located. CompuServe sought a declaratory judgment in Ohio that its product, 
CompuServe Navigator, did not infringe defendants’ trademark in “Windows Navigator.”  
The court assumed without further discussion that the clickwrap agreements entered into 
were valid, stating that the defendant “entered into a written contract with CompuServe 
which provided for the application of Ohio law,”54
 
46 Id. Clickwrap agreements are electronic agreements that require that consumers indicate assent by 
clicking an “I Accept,” “Yes,” or “I Agree” icon before proceeding to use the product or service.  Another 
type of online contract is referred to as a browsewrap, which usually means a contract, posted online but 
which does not require the user to expressly manifest assent. See Christina L. Kunz et al., Browse-Wrap 
Agreements: Validity of Implied Assent in Electronic Form Agreements, 59 BUS. LAW. 279 (2003). 
47 Kunz et al., supra note 46, lists a number of cases demonstrating this.  In addition: see Das, supra note 
23; Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
577 (2007); Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: the Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231 (2005) (stating that the “traditional picture of contract” as “the time-honored 
meeting of the minds” has been transformed; that “[t]he idea of voluntary willingness first decayed into 
consent, then into assent, then into the mere possibility or opportunity for assent, then to merely fictional 
assent, then to mere efficient rearrangement of entitlements without any consent or assent”); Todd Rakoff, 
The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235 (2006). 
48 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
49 See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 487. 
50 Id. 
51 ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452-53. 
52 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 488. 
 and noting that the defendant had been 
53 89 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (6th Cir. 1996). 
54 Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). 
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required to type “‘AGREE’ at various points in the document, ‘[i]n recognition of your 
online agreement to all the above terms and conditions.’”55
¶30  Similarly, in 1998, the District Court for the Northern District of California 
upheld Terms of Service of the free e-mail site Homail, in Hotmail Corporation v. Van 
Money Pie Inc.
 
56  The court enjoined the defendants from sending spam in violation of 
Hotmail’s contract, because in order to use Hotmail’s service, defendants, after being 
given the opportunity to view the Terms of Service, clicked on a box indicating their 
assent to be bound.57
¶31 Generally, the only cases where a court refused to enforce a contract against the 
consumer were those cases where the user was not required to assent to the terms or was 
asked to consent to the terms only after he downloaded the product.  For example, in 
Williams v. America Online, Inc.,
  
58 AOL subscribers’ computers were allegedly damaged 
after they downloaded Version 5.0 of the AOL software (causing unauthorized changes 
to the configuration of their computers so they could no longer access non-AOL Internet 
service providers or access personal information and files).59 The Williams court denied 
AOL’s motion to dismiss the case based on the forum clause, because AOL required 
assent to the AOL terms after the subscribers downloaded the software. The court 
reasoned that since the customers had not had an opportunity to review or accept the 
online contract before starting the download, the contract did not apply.60
¶32  There has been much litigation regarding AOL’s agreement (or lack of one in the 
Williams case), with some courts finding the AOL member agreement enforceable and 
others finding it unenforceable.  In 1998, in Groff v. America Online, Inc.,
 
61
 [T]he general rule [is] that a party who signs an instrument manifests his assent 
to it and cannot later complain that he did not read the instrument or that he did 
not understand its contents. Here, plaintiff effectively “signed” the agreement by 
clicking “I agree” not once but twice. Under these circumstances, he should not 
be heard to complain that he did not see, read, etc. and is bound to the terms of 
his agreement.
 the Rhode 
Island Superior Court found the AOL contract binding because AOL’s online contract 
acceptance procedure, required a user to first click on an “I agree” button indicating his 
assent to be bound by AOL’s Terms of Service before he could access AOL’s system. 
The court stated: 
62
 
55 Id.  
56 No. C98-20064, 1998 WL 388389 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 1998). 
57 Id. 
58 No. 00-0962, 2001 WL 135825 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2001). 
59 Id. at *2. 
60 Id.; see also Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to enforce 
Netscape’s contract because a user downloading free software would not see the End User License 
Agreement covering the SmartDownload software posted on the Netscape site until after already initiating 
the download). 
61 No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 27, 1998). 
62 Id. at *5; see also Caspi v. The Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
July 2, 1999) (upholding a forum selection clause in a clickwrap agreement, finding that the terms of this 
agreement appear in a scrollable window next to blocks containing the words “I agree” or “I disagree”).  
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¶33 In fact, this position echoes the long-held acknowledgement that consumers 
generally do not read form contracts, yet are still bound to the terms of the agreement.63
(1) The adherent’s signature on a document clearly contractual in nature, which 
he had an opportunity to read, will be taken to signify his assent and thus will 
provide the basis for enforcing the contract. 
  
For example, in 1983, Todd D. Rakoff, in his article critical of adhesion contracts, wrote 
that traditional doctrine for the previous several decades constituted the following four 
propositions: 
(2) It is legally irrelevant whether the adherent actually read the contents of the 
document, or understood them, or subjectively assented to them. 
(3) The adherent’s assent covers all the terms of the document, and not just the 
custom-tailored ones or the ones that have been discussed. 
(4) Exceptions to the foregoing principles are narrow. In particular, failure of the 
drafting party to point out or explain the form terms does not constitute an 
excuse. Instead, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, the adherent 
can establish an excuse only by showing affirmative participation by the 
drafting party in causing misunderstanding.64
Although standardized contracts, whether in paper or electronic format, have been widely 
criticized because they are full of legalese, give users no bargaining power,
 
65 or are 
incomprehensible,66 they have also been praised67
 
63 See Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 157 (1970) (“[S]ome people 
would sign a contract even if ‘THIS IS A SWINDLE’ were embossed across its top in electric pink.”); see 
also Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form 
Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269-70, 1275 (1993) (“It is no secret that consumers neither read 
nor understand standard form contracts. . . . Moreover, businesses hardly want the consumer to read form 
contracts.”). 
64 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174, 1185 
(1983). The example of an exception given in the fourth point is particularly relevant here because the FTC 
likely would claim that Sears affirmatively participated in causing misunderstanding.  
65 See id.; John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 740 (1982) (“This process does not deserve to be called contractual. It 
is not democratic and, in a society based on mass production which requires standardized forms even 
among competitors, it is essentially unfair.”). 
66 See, e.g., The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, Facebook’s Privacy Storm, 
http://futureoftheinternet.org/facebooks-privacy-storm (Feb. 18, 2009). 
 
One lesson is that plain English (and its other-language counterparts!) works better these 
days than legalese. When talented lawyers sit down to draft something like a set of terms 
of service, they naturally want terms that protect their client as much as possible — both 
in its current practices and for any future practices it could conceivably undertake. Plus 
they know that courts will hold this language against them in a dispute if there’s any 
wiggle room, since the company itself drafted it and the users couldn’t negotiate. So the 
writers tend to (1) reuse terms from other companies’ agreements like old holiday 
fruitcakes getting passed around, since venerable terms must be good ones and (2) they 
write broadly and at length. 
 
Id. 
67 See Richard Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 294-95 (1975) 
(arguing that courts interfere with efficient business practices). 
 and determined to be “essential.”  For 
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instance, as noted in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 211, Comment (a), 
contracts with standardized terms are essential for mass production and distribution and 
beneficial to all:  
Scarce and costly time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather 
than to details of individual transactions. Legal rules which would apply in the 
absence of an agreement can be shaped to fit the particular type of transaction. . . 
. Operations are simplified and costs are reduced, to the advantage of all 
concerned.68
They are particularly beneficial for companies offering products at little or no cost.  
Companies can contractually reduce their potential costs of dealing with disputes by 
requiring binding arbitration and/or prohibiting class actions to discourage consumers 
from suing, and pre-selecting a business-oriented tribunal and convenient forum.
 
69  
Companies can then offer products less expensively (and often free) using such mass 
market contracts.70
¶34  However, while long accepting that standardized contracts may be beneficial, it 
was also expected that courts would offer redress in egregious situations, such as those 
involving fraud, or where enforcing the contracts would be unconscionable or against 
public policy.
 
71   The Restatement, section 211(3), specifically delineates situations 
where certain contract terms would be unexpected: “Where the other party has reason to 
believe that the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing 
contained a particular term, the term is not part of the agreement.”72  Some courts have 
looked more critically at clickwrap agreements, particularly in the context of 
unconscionability and violation of public policy.  There has been a string of decisions 
based on California law,73
¶35  An early example is America Online, Inc. v. Superior Court (“Mendoza”)
 all involving situations in which the consumers had consented 
to the terms of the contracts at issue. 
74
 
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211, cmt. a. (1979). 
69 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 439 (noting the various benefits of standardized agreements). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 456. 
72 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (1979). 
73 Unconscionability is judged somewhat differently across jurisdictions. See Kunz et al., supra note 46.  
In California, for instance, unconscionability must be both procedural and substantive. 
74 90 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
  which 
was decided in 2001.  In Mendoza, a California state appellate court refused to uphold the 
forum selection provision in AOL’s member agreement in a putative class action suit in 
which the plaintiffs claimed that AOL continued to charge their credit cards for 
membership fees after they canceled their memberships.  The court held that the forum 
selection clause in the AOL contract was unenforceable because it was “unfair and 
unreasonable” and that the legal remedies of AOL’s selected forum, Virginia, were not 
comparable to those in California.  In addition, the court found that because one of the 
causes of action sought class action relief under California’s Consumers Legal Remedies 
Act, which includes a provision that voids any purported waiver of rights under the act as 
being contrary to California public policy, enforcement of forum selection and choice of 
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law clauses in the contract “would be the functional equivalent of a contractual waiver of 
the consumer protections” under the Act and was thus prohibited under California law. 
¶36 In Comb v. PayPal, Inc.,75
The procedural component can be satisfied by showing the existence of unequal 
bargaining positions and surprise through hidden terms common in the context of 
adhesion contracts. The substantive component can be satisfied by overly harsh 
or one-sided results that “shock the conscience.” 
. . . 
 which was decided in 2002, and which involved 
PayPal’s clickwrap agreement, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California refused to uphold the arbitration clause in PayPal’s contract against users who 
had filed a class action suit.  The court determined that the PayPal contract was an 
adhesion contract and was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable under 
California law. The court stated: 
A contract of adhesion, in turn, is a “standardized contract, which, imposed and 
drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing 
party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”76
¶37 The court further explained that the contract and its arbitration clause were 
unconscionable because they: (1) permitted PayPal to make binding amendments to the 
User Agreement at any time without prior notice to users; (2) permitted PayPal to freeze 
and hold customer funds in customer accounts until any dispute is resolved; (3) required 
users to bring claims individually and to arbitrate their disputes pursuant to the 
commercial rules of the American Arbitration Association (which the Court found 
seemed to be an attempt by PayPal “to insulate itself contractually from any meaningful 
challenge to its alleged practices”
 
77); and (4) required users throughout the U.S. to 
arbitrate in California where PayPal is located.78
¶38 Using similar reasoning, and applying California law, in 2007, in Bragg v. Linden 
Research, Inc.,
 
79 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania cited Comb. v. 
PayPal when refusing to uphold an arbitration clause in a contract for virtual real estate 
on the virtual website Second Life.  The court held that the procedural element of 
unconscionability also “focuses on . . . surprise.”80  In determining whether surprise 
exists, the court stated that California courts focus not on the plaintiff’s subjective 
reading of the contract, but rather, more objectively, on “the extent to which the 
supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in the prolix printed form drafted 
by the party seeking to enforce the disputed terms.”81  In Gutierrez,82
 
75 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
76 Id. at 1171. 
77 Id. at 1176. 
78 Id. at 1176-77. 
79 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
80 Id. at 606 (quoting Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 
81 Id. at 606. 
82 Gutierrez v. Autowest, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 the court had found 
such surprise where an arbitration clause was “particularly inconspicuous;” “printed in 
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eight-point typeface on the opposite side of the signature page of the lease.”83  The 
Linden court went on to state: “Here, although the [Terms of Service] are ubiquitous 
throughout Second Life, Linden buried the TOS’s arbitration provision in a lengthy 
paragraph under the benign heading ‘GENERAL PROVISIONS.’”84
¶39 It is notable that in 2009, two federal courts refused to uphold clickwrap 
agreements against consumers suing for privacy issues. In Doe 1 v. AOL LLC,
 
85 an action 
was brought in California by AOL members alleging violations of federal electronic 
privacy law,86 after AOL made publicly available the Internet search records of more than 
650,000 of its members.87  In this case, which was decided in January 2009, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit based its refusal to uphold the same forum provision in 
AOL’s member agreement on the Mendoza case decided eight years earlier.88
¶40 In Harris v. Blockbuster Inc.,
 
89 decided in April 2009, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas refused to uphold the Blockbuster clickwrap agreement 
against a consumer who alleged that Blockbuster violated the federal Video Privacy 
Protection Act90 by sharing information about her movie selections with third parties 
without first obtaining her consent.91  The alleged violation arose out of Blockbuster’s 
participation in Facebook’s “Beacon” advertising program, which allowed companies 
partnered with Facebook to advertise by posting notices in Facebook users’ “news feeds” 
when the user took an action, such as making a purchase from a third-party website that 
participated in the Beacon program.  When the program originally launched, Facebook 
users had the right to opt-out, but, in response to consumer complaints, Facebook 
changed Beacon to an opt-in system, and later retired the system.92  In Harris, which has 
been appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court ruled that because 
Blockbuster reserves the right to modify the Terms and Conditions, including the section 
that contains the arbitration provision, “at its sole discretion” and “at any time,” and such 
modifications will be effective immediately upon being posted on the site, Blockbuster’s 
arbitration provision in its clickwrap agreement is illusory, and thus unenforceable.93
¶41  Of course, two federal court cases do not make a trend, especially when one has 
been appealed, but it is notable that both 2009 cases noted above involve alleged 
violations of consumer privacy.  They are otherwise exceptions to the general rule that 
clickwrap agreements and notices are enforceable as long as the user has a reasonable 
opportunity to review the terms of the agreement and the user indicates assent.  Over the 
 
 
83 Id. at 276. 
84 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2007). 
85 Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009). 
86 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
87 Doe 1, 552 F.3d at 1083. 
88 See supra note 74. 
89 622 F. Supp. 2d 396 (N.D. Tex 2009). 
90 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). 
91 The Act prohibits movie rental providers from disclosing consumers’ personally identifiable 
information, including movie choices, to third parties without the informed written consent of the consumer 
at the time of the disclosure. 18 U.S.C. § 2710. 
92 Posting of David Sarno to L.A. Times Technology Blog, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/09/facebook-beacon-advertising.html (Sept. 21, 2009, 
6:39pm PST) (describing the pitfalls of Facebook’s Beacon advertising program and its ultimate 
withdrawal). 
93 Harris v. Blockbuster Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 396, 400 (N.D. Tex 2009). 
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nearly fifteen years since the first case involving a clickwrap, there have been numerous 
additional cases upholding the validity of a variety of clickwrap agreement terms, for 
example, over arbitration or dispute resolution clauses,94 forum selection clauses,95 
disclaimers of warranty,96 and limitations of liability97
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR ONLINE DISCLOSURES 
 provisions.  
¶42 
¶43 Whether such contracts will be upheld against consumers in the future, it is clear 
that the FTC will take action if online disclosures, particularly those that would likely be 
material to consumers, are not clear and conspicuous.  The 
Although some courts have taken a consumer-protective stance in the cases decided 
since the first clickwrap agreement over fourteen years ago, the majority have upheld 
clickwrap agreements against consumers.  Companies have long relied on this fact in 
drafting contracts and privacy policies.  However, the Sears Matter indicates that current 
industry standard practices for obtaining consent may no longer be appropriate, and that 
material terms can no longer be posted only in an online contract or privacy policy.  As 
will be discussed, this is particularly true in situations where consumers would likely be 
surprised to learn of certain terms, and where advertising or other notices have given a 
misleading message. 
requirements
(1) Clearly and prominently, and prior to the display of, and on a separate screen 
from, any final “end user license agreement,” “privacy policy,” “terms of 
use” page, or similar document, disclose: (1) all the types of data that the 
Tracking Application will monitor, record, or transmit, including but not 
limited to whether the data may include information from the consumer’s 
interactions with a specific set of websites or from a broader range of Internet 
interaction, whether the data may include transactions or information 
exchanged between the consumer and third parties in secure sessions, 
 imposed by the 
Decision and Order are quite exacting.  In accordance with the Decision and Order, Sears 
is prohibited from including material disclosures only in a privacy policy or user license 
agreement.  The Decision and Order requires that, in connection with the advertising, 
promotion, offering for sale, sale, or dissemination of any Tracking Application, prior to 
the consumer downloading or installing it, Sears must: 
 
94 See, e.g., In re RealNetworks, Inc., No. 00 C 1366, 2000 WL 631341 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2000) 
(rejecting claim that arbitration clause in a click-wrap agreement was not enforceable; defendant’s online 
click-wrap agreement was sufficient to meet the “writing” requirement of the Federal Arbitration Act). 
95 See, e.g., Universal Grading Serv. v. eBay, Inc., No. 08-CV-3557, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49841 
(E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009); Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007 (D.C. 2002) (upholding 
forum selection clause in Verizon’s clickwrap where the plaintiff entered into an Internet access 
subscription by clicking the “Accept” button at the end of the agreement which was presented in a scroll 
box).  
96 See, e.g., Scott v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 726 N.Y.S.2d 60 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) amended by Goshen v. 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 1190 (N.Y. 2002) (upholding disclaimer of warranty for problematic DSL 
services despite extensive advertising regarding reliability). 
97 See, e.g., A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008) (enforcing limitation on 
liability in clickwrap agreement in copyright lawsuit brought by high school students required to submit 
their papers to Turnitin website limitation of liability provision, rejecting students’ attempts to modify 
provision by disclaimer on papers), aff’d, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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interactions with shopping baskets, application forms, or online accounts, and 
whether the information may include personal financial or health 
information; (2) how the data may be used; and (3) whether the data may be 
used by a third party; and 
(2) Obtain express consent98 from the consumer to the download or installation 
of the Tracking Application and the collection of data by having the 
consumer indicate assent to those processes by clicking on a button or link 
that is not pre-selected as the default option and that is clearly labeled or 
otherwise clearly represented to convey that it will initiate those processes, or 
by taking a substantially similar action.99
¶44 Although the Decision and Order uses the terms “clear and prominent,” rather than 
“clear and conspicuous” as used in Dot Com Disclosures,
  
100
(1) In textual communications (e.g., printed publications or words displayed on 
the screen of a computer), the required disclosures are of a type, size, and 
location sufficiently noticeable for an ordinary consumer to read and 
comprehend them, in print that contrasts with the background on which they 
appear; 
 their meanings are 
equivalent.  The Decision and Order defines “clearly and prominently” to mean: 
(2) In communications disseminated orally or through audible means (e.g., radio 
or streaming audio), the required disclosures are delivered in a volume and 
cadence sufficient for an ordinary consumer to hear and comprehend them; 
(3) In communications disseminated through video means (e.g., television or 
streaming video), the required disclosures are in writing in a form consistent 
with subparagraph (A) of this definition and shall appear on the screen for a 
duration sufficient for an ordinary consumer to read and comprehend them, 
and in the same language as the predominant language that is used in the 
communication; 
(4) In communications made through interactive media, such as the Internet, 
online services, and software, the required disclosures are unavoidable and 
presented in a form consistent with subparagraph (A) of this definition, in 
addition to any audio or video presentation of them; and 
(5) In all instances, the required disclosures are presented in an understandable 
language and syntax, and with nothing contrary to, inconsistent with, or in 
mitigation of the disclosures used in any communication of them.101
 
98 As noted, Sears did obtain what many would considered affirmative consent from consumers prior to 
allowing installation of the Tracking Application. However, the FTC disregarded the consent because it 
was not informed consent.  
99 Decision and Order, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm. 
100 Dot Com Disclosures, supra note 35. 
101 Decision and Order, Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., File No. 082 3099 (Fed. Trade Comm’n June 4, 
2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0823099/index.shtm. 
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A. Questions Regarding Disclosures 
¶45 In light of the very specific requirements for placement of disclosures imposed on 
Sears, questions are raised as to whether this will become a standard for e-commerce 
disclosures.  This is an important issue for e-commerce because consent and notice are 
required under so many mechanisms, not only for contract acceptance but also for various 
forms of permissive marketing and notice procedures.  However, although the Decision 
and Order places very specific requirements on Sears, it does not necessarily indicate that 
the FTC’s position is that no such disclosures could be made in user license agreements 
or privacy notices.  Rather, the FTC has clarified that disclosures made in user license 
agreements (also referred to as end user license agreements or “EULAs”) or privacy 
notices may not be sufficient to correct a misleading impression created elsewhere (for 
example, in advertising materials).  The FTC’s statements regarding EULA disclosure to 
the Direct Marketing Association in response to questions about
 
 another case involving 
the sufficiency of material disclosures is helpful: 
[I]t is important for industry to recognize that a EULA disclosure alone may not 
be sufficient to correct a misleading impression created elsewhere.  See, e.g., 
FTC, Dot Com Disclosures (adequacy of disclosure required to prevent deception 
is based on the overall net impression) (available at 
www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/dotcom/index.html); cf. FTC v. 
Cyberspace.com, LLC, 453 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006) (fine print notices 
are insufficient to undo deceptive net impression); FTC v. Gill, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
1030, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d 265 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(disclaimers and truthful statements that are made outside the context of a 
deceptive representation do not automatically undo the deception and exonerate 
deceptive activities). Accordingly, the Commission will analyze EULA-only 
disclosure on a case-by-case basis, weighing what information is material to 
consumers and the overall, net impression upon the consumer regarding the 
transaction.102
¶46 However, the Sears Matter raises the concern that typically it is necessary to make 
many disclosures, which brings up a question as to how to determine what is most 




Therefore, it is possible that the FTC will accept disclosures that are made only in privacy 
policies or contracts which otherwise meet FTC notice requirements. 
B. Advertising Materials Should Be Reviewed In The Context of Online Contracts and 
Privacy Policies 
¶47 As noted in the Introduction, the Sears Matter is a reminder that advertising 
materials (and particularly advertising associated with tracking of consumer personal 
data) should receive legal review to determine whether such materials comply with 
advertising legal requirements.  In addition, the Sears matter signals that advertising 
 
102 Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Jerry Cerasale, Senior Vice President, 
Direct Mktg. Ass’n, (Mar. 7, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523130/0523130c4186lettercommenterDMA.pdf. 
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materials should also be reviewed together with the terms of online contracts and privacy 
policies associated with the advertising campaign. This is to ensure that material 
disclosures are included clearly and conspicuously in advertising materials so that they do 
not leave the consumer with a misleading impression of the transaction.  The Sears 
PSULA likely would not have concerned the FTC if the advertising materials presented 
to the consumer had clearly and prominently disclosed the functions of the Tracking 
Application early in the process. 
V. REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVACY NOTICES 
A. If the “Perfect” Privacy Notice is Written, Will Anyone Read It? 
¶48 In 2007, Jon Leibowitz
Initially, privacy policies seemed like a good idea. But in practice, they often 
leave a lot to be desired. In many cases, consumers don’t notice, read, or 
understand the privacy policies. They are often posted inconspicuously via a link 
at the very bottom of the site’s homepage – and filled with fine-print legalese and 
technotalk. A recent study submitted as a comment for this Town Hall examined 
privacy policies of Fortune 500 companies and found that they were essentially 
incomprehensible for the majority of Internet users.
, then Commissioner of the FTC, stated: 
103
(1) Privacy policies are too difficult to read . . . . 
 
Similarly, the University of California, Berkeley, School of Information recently cited 
several reasons why privacy policies are ineffective: 
(2) [P]rivacy policies lead consumers to believe that their privacy is 
protected. . . . . 
(3) Even if they could understand them, the amount of time required to read 
privacy policies is too great.  A 2008 study estimated that if users actually 
read privacy policies, it would take approximately 200 hours a year to read 
the policy for every unique website visited in a year, not to mention updated 
policies for sites visited on a repeating basis . . . .104
However, the problem is larger than simply that notices are too long and complex.  
Studies show that consumers generally will not read policies and disclosures no matter 
how short they are.  As discussed, the fact is that consumers often do not want to be 
bothered with reading “pesky legalese.”
 
105  Studies have shown that consumers do not 
read mortgage documents,106 disclosures in magazines,107 video disclosures (supers),108
 
103 Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on 
“Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting & Technology” 4 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071031ehavior.pdf. 
104 UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF INFORMATION, KNOWPRIVACY 11 (June 1, 2009) (emphasis in 
original), available at http://knowprivacy.org/report/KnowPrivacy_Final_Report.pdf. 
105 i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002). 
 
106 See Pauline M. Ippolito, Acting Dir., Bureau of Econ., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumer Research in 
Policymaking: Applying Recent Findings Regarding Consumer Literacy and Behavior, Remarks at the 
2009 ABA Consumer Protection Conference (June 19, 2009) (recording on file with ABA Section of 
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and privacy policies.109  Also, according to Michael B. Mazis, marketing claims trump 





[M]any online consumers exhibit certain characteristics, including inattention, 
unwarranted confidence, exuberance, and a desire for immediate gratification, 
which make them less likely to see and read disclosures. Panelists further 
explained that, as result of these online characteristics, consumers become “click-
happy” and quickly navigate through webpages, without paying much attention 
because they believe nothing will go wrong and want to complete the transaction 
as rapidly as possible. As a result, consumers often do not read or understand the 
terms of the agreements they accept.
 at a FTC Workshop in January 2007, consumers do not pay attention to 
disclosures (including online contracts and privacy notices) because they are “click-
happy” and believe that nothing can go wrong: 
111
Such “click-happiness” has also been confirmed in the context of social networks (and 
specifically Facebook) by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University.
 
112  Their recent 
brief studies indicate that even when Facebook users become aware of privacy risks, they 
tend to ignore them.  Participants in the studies said that they “had nothing to hide” and 
“they don’t really care if other people see their information.”113
 
Antitrust Law); see also Alan Levy, Senior Scientist, Food & Drug Admin., Consumer Research in 
Policmaking: Applying Recent Findings Regarding Consumer Literacy and Behavior, Remarks at the 2009 
ABA Consumer Protection Conference (June 19, 2009) (recording on file with ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law).  The remarks by Ippolito and Levy are summarized by Rebecca Tushnet on her blog at 
http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2009/06/aba-consumer-protection-conference.html. 
107 Michael B. Mazis, Consumer Research in Policymaking: Applying Recent Findings Regarding 
Consumer Literacy and Behavior, Remarks at the 2009 ABA Consumer Protection Conference (June 19, 
2009) (recording on file with ABA Section of Antitrust Law).  The remarks by Mazis are summarized by 
Rebecca Tushnet on her blog at http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2009/06/aba-consumer-protection-
conference.html. 
108 Id. 
109 See UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, SCHOOL OF INFORMATION, supra note 104. 
110 See Mazis, supra note 107. 
111 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 39, at ii-iii.  Moreover, as reported by Hillman & Rachlinski: 
  
The cognitive factors undermine many of the benefits to consumers of electronic 
contracting. Indeed, they may explain why the Internet has failed to produce the efficient 
competition that theorists have anticipated. E-consumers who are satisfied with limited 
information about businesses have no use for the extra search time that Internet shopping 
offers. E-consumers also might worry about accumulating too much information, 
impairing their decisionmaking processes. 
 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 484. 
112 See generally Tabreez Govani & Harriet Pashley, Student Awareness of the Privacy Implications 
When Using Facebook (2005), http://lorrie.cranor.org/courses/fa05/tubzhlp.pdf; Ralph Gross & Alessandro 
Acquisti, Information Revelation and Privacy in Online Networks (The Facebook Case) (Nov. 7, 2005), 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/privacy-facebook-gross-acquisti.pdf. 
113 Govani & Pashley, supra note 112, § 6. 
  The Carnegie Mellon 
study concluded that it will take an unfortunate incident such as identity theft or stalking 
to shock Facebook users into being more selective about the information that they make 
Vol. 8:1] Susan E. Gindin 
 23 
available to other users.114  Another study conducted on behalf of Canada’s Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner indicates that Facebook users may be aware of privacy risks but 
provide extensive personal information in order to be popular.  Participants reported 
caring about privacy, but because Facebook is where they experience their social lives, it 
might be too risky not to participate.115  What’s more, as noted earlier, consumer 
decisions to ignore disclosures are not limited to the online world.  Consumers have long 
ignored disclosures in the offline world as well.  Consumers have signed contracts 
without reading them for decades.116  As Arthur Allen Leff wrote in 1970, “[s]ome people 
would sign a contract even if ‘THIS IS A SWINDLE’ were embossed across its top in 
electric pink.”117  Michael Froomkin contends that consumers using the Internet 
myopically ignore important information in standard terms, particularly terms that relate 
to privacy issues.118  Froomkin also acknowledges that it may be more accurate that 
consumers ignore privacy notices because they do not care about their Internet privacy,119 
a point that has also been expressed by industry leaders such as Microsoft’s Bill Gates 
and Sun Microsystems’ Scott McNealy.120
¶50  In addition, not every privacy risk can be addressed with a privacy notice.  
Jonathan Zittrain points out that in addition to privacy risks from government and 
institutions, there are substantial risks to privacy from third parties, for example, friends 




115 See News Release, University of Guelph, Popularity Fuels Disclosure on Facebook, Study Finds 
(Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.uoguelph.ca/news/2009/08/popularity_fuel.html. 
116 See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 23, at 461.  
117 Leff, supra note 63, at 157. 
118 A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1501-05 (2000). 
119 Id.  Froomkin wrote: 
 
The ultimate effect of consumer privacy myopia depends upon a number of things. First, 
it depends on the intrusiveness of the profile. If the profile creates a privacy intrusion that 
is noticeably greater than disclosing an occasional individual fact—that is, if aggregation 
not only adds value but aggravation—then privacy myopia is indeed a problem. I suspect 
that this is, in fact, the case and that many people share my intuition. It is considerably 
more intrusive to find strangers making assumptions about me, be they true or painfully 
false, than it is to have my name and address residing in a database restricted to the firms 
from which I buy. On the other hand, if people who object to being profiled are unusual, 
and aggregation does not cause harm to most people's privacy, the main consequence of 
privacy myopia is greatly reduced. For some, it is only distributional. Consumers who 
place a low value on their information privacy - people for whom their average valuation 
is less than the average valuation of a profiler - would have agreed to sell their privacy 
even if they were aware of the long-run consequences. The only harm to them is that they 
have not extracted the highest price possible. But consumers who place a high value on 
information privacy will be more seriously harmed by their information myopia. Had 
they been aware of the average value of each datum, they might have preferred not to 
sell. 
 
Id. at 1503. 
120 See, e.g., Heather Timmons, Gates Faults U.S. on Data Privacy and Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 
24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/25/technology/companies/25soft.html (reporting 
that Mr. Gates was critical of the United States government’s unwillingness to adopt a national identity 
card); Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over It’, WIRED, Jan. 26, 1999, 
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538 (reporting comments by Scott McNearly—head of 
Sun Microsystems—that consumer privacy issues are a “red herring”). 
N O R T H WE S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY [ 2 0 0 9  
 
 24 
photos and post them online.121  Such third parties certainly do not provide privacy 
notices with such postings, unlike government and institutions which usually post some 
type of notice. Moreover, there are indications that consumers’ seeming lack of concern 
about privacy issues stems more from unawareness rather than from informed unconcern.  
For example, consider the uproar over privacy issues when Facebook introduced the 
Beacon advertising program and made other changes in its privacy policies.  Beacon 
allowed companies partnered with Facebook to advertise by posting notices in Facebook 
users’ “news feeds” when the user took an action, such as making a purchase from a 
third-party website that participated in the Beacon program.  When the program 
originally launched, Facebook users had the right to opt-out, but, in response to consumer 
complaints, Facebook changed Beacon to an opt-in system, and later retired the system.122
¶51  Consumer disregard of privacy risks may be related to consumers’ inability to do 
more to control the uses of their personal information. Daniel Solove states that: 
  
 
People often surrender personal data to companies because they perceive that 
they do not have much choice. They might also do so because they lack 
knowledge about the potential future uses of the information. Part of the privacy 
problem in these cases involves people’s limited bargaining power respecting 
privacy and inability to assess the privacy risks.123 
 
In fact, a 2009 study conducted by the University of Pennsylvania and University of 
California at Berkeley shows that about two-thirds of Americans object to online tracking 
by advertisers, and once they learn the different ways marketers are following their online 
movements, that number rises to 73%.  An additional 7 percent said behavioral 
advertising was not acceptable when they were tracked on a website, an additional 18 
percent said it was not acceptable when they were tracked via other websites, and an 
additional 20 percent said it was not acceptable when they were tracked offline.124  Then 
again, consumers who are concerned about privacy might not object to collection and 
uses of data about them if they were aware of such collection and uses and had an 
opportunity to control what is known about them.125  
 
121 The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, Facebook’s Privacy Storm, 
http://futureoftheinternet.org/facebooks-privacy-storm (Feb. 18, 2009).  Zittrain optimistically envisions a 
time when prospective employers (who have also had Facebook pages), and others who have reason to 
view a person's online history, will view each person's positive history along with the negative.  Id. 
122 Posting of David Sarno to L.A. Times Technology Blog, supra note 92. 
123 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 73 (2008).  On the other hand, maybe the problem is 
that it is not well articulated.  As noted by Solove, “Privacy problems are often not well articulated, and as 
a result, we frequently lack a compelling account of what is at stake when privacy is threatened and what 
precisely the law must do to solve these problems.”  Id. at 2.  
124 Joseph Turow et al., Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that Enable It (Sept. 
29, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214 [hereinafter University of Pennsylvania/University 
of California Study]. 
125 At least that was the viewpoint of Louis Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren in their seminal law review 
article on privacy. See Louis Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
198 (1890) (“The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what 
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.”). 
According to Joseph Turow, lead 
author of the University of Pennsylvania/University of California study: 
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“I don’t think that behavioral targeting is something that we should eliminate, but 
I do think that we’re at a cusp of a new era, and the kinds of information that 
companies share and have today is nothing like we’ll see 10 years from now,” 
Professor Turow said. He said he would like “a regime in which people feel they 
have control over the data that marketers collect about them. The most important 
thing is to bring the public into the picture, which is not going on right now.”126
¶52 
 
Of course, the University of Pennsylvania/University of California study also raises 
the issue of how many of the participants, newly aware of how they are tracked, will now 
take steps to protect their privacy.  Katherine Strandburg notes that people often disclose 
personal information frequently despite having indicated a preference for keeping such 
information private, and this is particularly true in the context of online disclosures.127  
Alessandro Acquisiti and Jens Grossklags have reported that few individuals take 
affirmative steps to protect their online privacy,128 and the Carnegie Mellon Facebook 
study discussed above showed that 84% of participants reported that they are aware that 
they can change their privacy settings, but less than 48% of the 84% made use of the 
privacy settings.129
¶53  Assuming that privacy notices of some type are necessary, the problem is further 
complicated because privacy policies are necessarily complex.  A certain amount of 
“fine-print legalese and technotalk” are inherently necessary because the technical issues 
are usually very complicated and the legal requirements make policies fairly detailed.  
The FTC has seen firsthand how difficult it is to draft effective form privacy policies 
through its participation in the ongoing, eight-year interagency notice research project 
(along with banking regulators and the Securities & Exchange Commission) to draft 




126 See Stephanie Clifford, Two-Thirds of Americans Object to Online Tracking, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/business/media/30adco.html. Interestingly, fewer 
participants in the University of Pennsylvania/University of California study objected to tracking related to 
customized discounts and customized news than to tracking in general; 51% of the participant said that 
customized discounts were acceptable and 58% said that customized news was fine. See University of 
Pennsylvania/University of California Study, supra note 124. 
127 Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy, Rationality, and Temptation: A Theory of Willpower Norms, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1235, 1264 (2005). 
  Furthermore, it is 
128 Alessandro Acquisiti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy Attitudes and Privacy Behavior: Losses, Gains, and 
Hyperbolic Discounting, in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY (J. Camp & R. Lewis eds., 
Kluwer 2004), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti_grossklags_eis_refs.pdf. 
129 See Govani & Pashley, supra note 112, § 5.3. 
130 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 6801-09 (2006); see FTC, Privacy Initiatives, 
Financial Privacy Rule: Interagency Notice Research Project, 
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/financial_rule_inrp.html (last visited July 30, 2009).  Joel 
Winston, the FTC’s former Associate Director for the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection 
questioned the value of disclosures: 
 
I think there’s a serious question here about whether it’s simply not feasible for 
businesses or for consumers to go -- use this sort of notice and choice model. Is it more 
information than consumers can handle? Is it too difficult for businesses to explain in a 
way that gives consumers sort of both sides of the equation? Is it too much to expect of 
consumers? 
 
Joel Winston, former Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Div. of Privacy and Identity Protection, 
Welcome and Introductory Remarks, FTC Town Hall Meeting on “Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, 
N O R T H WE S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY [ 2 0 0 9  
 
 26 
not just consumers without legal backgrounds who are not reading disclosures, privacy 
policies, and online contracts; judges and lawyers exhibit this “click-happy” behavior as 
well.131
B. What Makes a Good Privacy Notice? 
 
¶54 Federal agencies, including the FTC, as well as universities,132 businesses,133 
advertisers, and a policy institute134 are working towards drafting models of effective 
disclosures and policies.135  Over the past few years in particular, the FTC has concluded 
that privacy policies should be presented (at least initially) in short statements.  For 
example, in its February 2009 report to the U.S. Congress on behavioral advertising,136
 
[P]rivacy policies have become long and difficult to understand, and may not be 
an effective way to communicate information to consumers. Staff therefore 
encourages companies to design innovative ways – outside of the privacy policy 
– to provide behavioral advertising disclosures and choice options to consumers. 
 
 
the FTC explained:  
. . . . [A] disclosure (e.g., “why did I get this ad?”) that is located in close 
proximity to an advertisement and links to the pertinent section of a privacy 
policy explaining how data is collected for purposes of delivering targeted 
advertising, could be an effective way to communicate with consumers. Indeed, 
such a disclosure is likely to be far more effective than a discussion (even a clear 
one) that is buried within a company’s privacy policy. Further . . . some 
businesses have already begun to experiment with designing other creative and 
effective disclosure mechanisms. Staff encourages these efforts and notes that 
they may be most effective if combined with consumer education programs that 
explain not only what information is collected from consumers and how it is 
 
Targeting & Technology” 59 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ehavioral/71102wor.pdf. 
131 i.LAN Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (D. Mass. 2002) (district 
judge’s primary account of “pesky legalese”). 
132 See, e.g., Press Release, Carnegie Mellon Univ., Carnegie Mellon’s Lorrie Cranor Receives NSF 
Funding for Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Privacy and Security (Aug. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.cit.cmu.edu/media/press/2009/08_24_cranor_nsf_funding.html. 
133 See, e.g., Google, Inc., Choose Your Google Toolbar Configuration, 
http://toolbar.google.com/prdlg.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2009) (describing the terms of use for Google’s 
“Toolbar” software). 
134 Press Release, Future of Privacy Forum, Future of Privacy Forum Announces Research Initiative To 
Develop Effective Messages to Communicate with Users about Online Data Use (May 19, 2009), available 
at http://www.futureofprivacy.org/2009/05/19/future-of-privacy-forum-announces-research-initiative-to-
develop-effective-messages-to-communicate-with-users-about-online-data-use/. 
135 See, e.g., U.S. Food and Drug Admin., Consumer Research on Food Labels, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/ScienceResearch/ResearchAreas/ConsumerResearch/ucm080407.htm (last 
visited Aug. 4, 2009); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Releases Staff Report on Improving 
Consumer Mortgage Disclosures (June 13, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/06/mortgage.shtm; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 
et al., Federal Regulators Seek Public Comment on Model Privacy Notice (Mar. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/03/jointrelease.shtm. 
136 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14. 
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used, but also the tradeoffs involved – that is, what consumers obtain in exchange 
for allowing the collection and use of their personal information.137
The FTC seems to have found an effective format for mortgage notices.  Disclosure form 
testing has shown that the prototype mortgage notices, which the FTC prepared as part of 




138  The FTC has suggested a similar format for privacy notices.  In addition, 
Lorrie Cranor and her students at Carnegie Mellon advocate use of a very short notice 
similar to a nutrition label,139 so that consumers wanting to know more about the privacy 
of a particular site can check the label.140
¶55 Another example of a seemingly effective privacy notice is that accompanying the 
installation of Google’s “Toolbar” software.  That privacy notice is introduced with a 
short notice in red caps: “PLEASE READ THIS CAREFULLY, IT’S NOT THE USUAL 
YADA YADA.”
  The Carnegie Mellon and FTC models will 
likely be successful in providing the necessary information in an easy-to-read format for 
consumers who are concerned about privacy risks.  However, they will not be effective 
for consumers who remain unconcerned or unaware of those risks. 
141
C. Particular Scrutiny When “Sensitive” Data is Collected and When Collected Data is 
Shared with Third Parties 
 
¶56 With the exacting requirement for future tracking applications in the Sears Matter 
and its current dialogue regarding behavioral advertising, the FTC has indicated that 
online businesses and advertisers must obtain affirmative express consent to (or 
prohibition against) using sensitive data for tracking purposes.  Although there is lack of 
agreement on the exact definition of “sensitive data,” there is consensus within the FTC 
that such data merits some form of heightened protection.142  As generally described in 
the 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report,143
 
137 Id. at 35-36. 
138 FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: 
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE FORMS (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505MortgageDisclosureexecutivesummary.pdf. The FTC’s report 
produced four major findings: (1) current mortgage cost disclosures failed to convey key mortgage costs to 
many consumers; (2) prototype disclosures developed for the study significantly improved consumer 
recognition of mortgage costs, demonstrating that better disclosures are feasible; (3) both prime and 
subprime borrowers failed to understand key loan terms, and both groups benefitted from the improved 
disclosures; and (4) improved disclosures provided the greatest benefit for more complex loans, where both 
prime and subprime borrowers had the most difficulty understanding loan terms). Id. at 5-6.  
139 See Larry Dobrow, Privacy’s Nutrition Label, INSIDE 1TO1: PRIVACY (Int’l Ass’n of Privacy Prof’ls, 
York, Me.), Aug. 2009, available at 
http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs025/1101351458623/archive/1102647447169.html#LETTER.BLOCK
26 (on file with the author). 
140 See id. 
141 Google, Inc., Choose Your Google Toolbar Configuration, http://toolbar.google.com/prdlg.html (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2009) (describing the terms of use for Google’s “Toolbar” software). 
142 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14, at 42. 
143 Described in note 14, supra. 
 sensitive data categories include 
information about children and adolescents, medical information, financial information 
and account numbers, social security numbers, sexual orientation information, 
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government-issued identifiers, and precise geographic location.144
[P]re-checked boxes or disclosures that are buried in a privacy policy or a 
uniform licensing agreement are unlikely to be sufficiently prominent to obtain a 
consumer’s “affirmative express consent.” . . . Indeed, this protection is 
particularly important in the context of online behavioral advertising, where data 
collection is typically invisible to consumers who may believe that they are 
searching anonymously for information about medications, diseases, sexual 
orientation, or other highly sensitive topics.
  The report went on to 
address specifically the collection of sensitive data in the behavioral advertising context:  
145
As next discussed, the dialogue regarding regulation of behavioral advertising has 
intensified in part due to the behavioral tracking Sears was conducting without adequate 
disclosures to affected consumers.  The FTC’s concerns about transparency in the 
collection and use of consumer information, particularly sensitive information, are very 
similar for behavioral advertising.  In fact, since announcement of its enforcement action 
against Sears in June 2009, the FTC has also mentioned the Sears Matter in its high-
profile discussions of behavioral advertising.
 
146
VI. PORTENTS FOR BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 
  The behavioral advertising dialogue is 
next discussed. 
Most of the online world is based on a simple, if unarticulated, agreement: 
consumers browse Web sites free, and in return, they give up data — like their 
gender or income level — which the sites use to aim their advertisements. 
The new head of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal Trade 
Commission, David C. Vladeck, says it is time for that to change. In an 
interview, Mr. Vladeck outlined plans that could upset the online advertising 
ecosystem. Privacy policies have become useless, the commission’s standards for 
the cases it reviews are too narrow, and some online tracking is “Orwellian,” Mr. 
Vladeck said. 
After eight years of what privacy advocates and the industry saw as a relatively 
pro-business commission, Mr. Vladeck, has made a splash. In June, the 
commission settled a case with Sears that was a warning shot to companies that 
thought their privacy policies protected them. In just over six weeks on the job, 
he has asked Congress for a bigger budget and for a streamlined way to create 
regulations. And he said he would hire technologists to help analyze online 
marketers’ tracking. . . . 
 
144 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14, at 42, 44. 
145 Id. at 44. 
146 See, e.g., Editors, An Interview with David Vladeck of the F.T.C., 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/an-interview-with-david-vladeck-of-the-ftc/ (Aug. 5, 
2009, 2:24pm EST); Letter from Fed. Trade Comm’n to the Honorable Bobby Rush et al. (June 16, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P095413onlineadvertising.pdf [hereinafter Letter to Honorable 
Bobby Rush]. 
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But marketers say such a tactic would be disastrous. “It’s impossible to 
communicate the value proposition to a consumer at the point of an 
advertisement,” said Matt Wise, chief executive of Q Interactive, a Chicago 
online marketing firm. Mandatory opt-in “would be a tremendous setback in 
innovation,” he said.147
¶57  The above report of the New York Times interview with the FTC’s new head of 
the Bureau of Consumer Protection illustrates many of the issues running throughout the 
current dialogue about how behavioral advertising should be regulated.  The Sears Matter 
also provides lessons for online businesses and advertisers that use behavioral advertising 
methods because it addresses several of the same concerns the FTC has expressed 
regarding online behavioral advertising (also referred to as “behavioral tracking,” 
“behavioral marketing,” and “targeted marketing”).  It also suggests the types of acts or 
practices in the behavioral advertising arena that may prompt the FTC to take 
enforcement action. 
 
¶58 The FTC defines “online behavioral advertising” to mean “the tracking of a 
consumer’s online activities over time – including the searches the consumer has 
conducted, the web pages visited, and the content viewed – in order to deliver advertising 
targeted to the individual consumer’s interests.”148  Behavioral advertising uses targeting 
technologies to collect information regarding a user’s web-browsing behavior, such as the 
pages they have visited or the searches they have made, and sometimes with data 
collected by third parties outside the Internet,149
¶59 In the ongoing behavioral advertising dialogue, the Sears Matter is notable because 
it is the FTC’s first enforcement action for behavioral tracking brought against a 
prominent “brick and mortar” company with an online presence, and using Internet 
technologies as part of its advertising campaigns.  In contrast, in previous enforcement 
actions involving behavioral tracking, the companies were fairly typical Internet 
entrepreneurial endeavors  – only a few years old and launched with minimal, if any, 
legal advice, by a few entrepreneurs using Internet technologies entirely on the Internet.  
The fact that Sears was fully embracing the behavioral tracking technologies signaled that 
such uses are now mainstream.  Therefore, it intensified the behavioral advertising 
dialogue and the concern that consumers are not aware of the data which is collected 
about them as they navigate online. 
 to serve ads to consumers. 
¶60 Generally, the data which is collected through behavioral advertising is not 
personally identifiable information in that it does not personally identify particular 
individuals but rather identifies users through anonymous cookies150
 
147 Clifford, supra note 18. 
148 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14, at 46. This definition refers to “third-party” 
uses as distinguished from “first party” advertising, where no data is shared with third parties, or contextual 
advertising, where an ad is based on a single visit to a web page or single search query.  
149 See Clifford, supra note 18. 
 or other anonymous 
150 A cookie is information about the Web site visit, which the Web browser receives from the Web site, 
and then stores on the visitor’s hard drive. The Web site then “reads” the information each time the user 
visits the site. This information may include the visitor’s Internet service provider, the kind of computer 
and software used, the Web site linked from, as well as which files were accessed and the amount of time 
spent on each page. The information is used to track visits to the Web site to learn what visitors like and 
dislike about the site, and to personalize the site so that options the user selects at the first visit can be used 
automatically for each successive visit.  See Gindin, supra note 31, at 1170.  
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tracking technologies.  However, in fact, researchers have shown that there is really no 
such thing as “non-personally identifiable information” because researchers, using 
surprisingly little additional information, have been successful in identifying individuals 
in data containing so-called anonymized or non-personally identifiable information.151  
This is significant because most privacy protection laws distinguish between personally 
identifiable information (“PII”) and non-personally identifiable information (“non-PII”) 
with PII receiving substantially greater protection.152  However, with a few exceptions, 
such as in 2006, when AOL published the search engine queries of its users (and 
unintentionally revealed the identity of certain searchers),153
¶61   However, with the reports that advertisers are now combining anonymous data 
with PII (some of it likely based on historical purchases and actions) in order to serve 
more targeted ads, the issue is no longer purely academic.  For example, as reported by 
 “re-identifying” anonymized 
data has so far been primarily the province of resourceful researchers. 
the New York Times: 
Companies like Acxiom and a competitor, Datran Media, make the connection 
between online and offline data when a person registers on a Web site or clicks 
through on an e-mail message from a marketer. . . . Acxiom estimates it has 
1,500 pieces of data on every American, based on information from warranty 
cards, bridal and birth registries, magazine subscriptions, public records and even 
dog registrations with the American Kennel Club.154 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation also reported that tracking companies may be 
identifying specific individuals through social networks: 
When you visit a webpage, there’s a good chance that it contains tiny images or 
invisible JavaScript that exists for the sole purpose of tracking and recording 
your browsing habits. This sort of tracking is performed by many dozens of 
different firms. In this post, we’re going to look at how this tracking occurs, and 
how it is being combined with data from accounts on social networking sites to 
build extensive, identified profiles of your online activity.155
The FTC briefly touched on such secondary uses in its 2009 report, Self-Regulatory 
Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising (“2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising 
Report”)
 
156 but declined to provide guidelines since reports of such uses were not yet 
substantiated.157
 
151 See, e.g., Ohm, supra note 31. 
 
152 In this regard, see the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), 
which provides substantially greater rights for “individually identifiable health information”—information 
which identifies an individual (or there is a reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to 
identify the individual)—than for information which has been anonymized or de-identified.  
153 See the discussion of Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2009), discussed supra in text 
accompanying notes 85-87. 
154 Clifford, supra note 18. 
155 Eckersley, supra note 19. 
156 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14, at 44-45. 
157 Id. 
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¶62 Since commercialization of the Internet, commentators have noted the potential for 
third parties to track users as they navigate the Internet, whether for advertising or other 
purposes: 
 
The Internet has the capacity to be the most effective data-collector in existence.. 
. The information collected from Web site visits reveals much about the user. 
Even without providing personal information when registering to use a site, a 
user’s interests can be inferred based on Web site or online service use. 
Accordingly, there is concern that this information will be misused by marketers 
and others. 
. . . . 
An Internet user’s privacy may be invaded by certain features used by some 
online services and World Wide Web site operators to maintain and improve 
their service. Some Web sites collect “cookies.” . . . . As such, the information 
collected does not usually identify a specific individual. However, when 
combined with on-site registration data, which the Internet user provides when 
visiting some sites, cookie data may be used to build a profile of the specific 
Internet user. Many Web sites require on-site registration, including name, 
address, e-mail address, and sometimes interests, in order to obtain access or 
certain benefits.158
The FTC has long been concerned about online behavioral advertising, and in 1999, the 




159  There has been increasing concern, particularly in the past few years, in 
U.S. government agencies and Congress and among consumer groups, that users are 
being tracked too much online, with information about their Web browsing, shopping 
habits and overall interests being collected for advertising purposes.  Indeed, for years, 
the FTC has urged companies to self-regulate as an industry practice, and has recently 
asked companies to redouble their efforts to develop self-regulatory programs, and to 
ensure that such programs include meaningful enforcement.160  The FTC issued 
guidelines and requests for comments regarding behavioral advertising in 2007,161  and in 
2009, the FTC followed with a report regarding the comments received and issued 
revised guidelines.162
(1) Transparency and Consumer Control 
  As part of the 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, the FTC 
articulated four principles regarding requirements for behavioral advertising: 
(2) Reasonable Security, and Limited Data Retention, for Consumer Data 
(3) Affirmative Express Consent for Material Changes to Existing Privacy 
Promises 
 
158 See Gindin, supra note 31, at 1164, 1170. 
159 FTC and Dep’t of Commerce, Public Workshop: Online Profiling, Nov. 8, 1999, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/profiling/index.shtm. 
160 See Letter to Honorable Bobby Rush, supra note 146. 
161 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Staff Proposes Online Behavioral Advertising Privacy 
Principles (Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/principles.shtm. 
162 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14. 
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(4) Affirmative Express Consent to (or Prohibition Against) Using Sensitive 
Data for Behavioral Advertising163
These principles also apply outside the behavioral advertising realm, as seen in other FTC 
enforcement actions.  For example, the Sears Matter, and also the FTC’s action against 
ValueClick in part because of its failure to clearly and conspicuously disclose key terms 
in an advertising campaign which offered free merchandise in exchange for consumer 





163 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, supra note 14, at 46-47.  With regard to transparency and 
consumer control, the FTC stated: 
 
Every website where data is collected for behavioral advertising should provide a clear, 
concise, consumer-friendly, and prominent statement that (1) data about consumers’ 
activities online is being collected at the site for use in providing advertising about 
products and services tailored to individual consumers’ interests, and (2) consumers can 
choose whether or not to have their information collected for such purpose. The website 
should also provide consumers with a clear, easy-to-use, and accessible method for 
exercising this option. Where the data collection occurs outside the traditional website 
context, companies should develop alternative methods of disclosure and consumer 
choice that meet the standards described above (i.e., clear, prominent, easy-to-use, etc.) 
 
Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).  Regarding security and limited data retention, it said: 
 
Any company that collects and/or stores consumer data for behavioral advertising should 
provide reasonable security for that data. Consistent with data security laws and the 
FTC’s data security enforcement actions, such protections should be based on the 
sensitivity of the data, the nature of a company’s business operations, the types of risks a 
company faces, and the reasonable protections available to a company. Companies 
should also retain data only as long as is necessary to fulfill a legitimate business or 
law enforcement need. 
 
Id. at 46-47 (emphasis in original).  As for affirmative express consent for material changes to existing 
privacy policies, it said: 
 
As the FTC has made clear in its enforcement and outreach efforts, a company must keep 
any promises that it makes with respect to how it will handle or protect consumer data, 
even if it decides to change its policies at a later date. Therefore, before a company can 
use previously collected data in a manner materially different from promises the company 
made when it collected the data, it should obtain affirmative express consent from 
affected consumers.  This principle would apply in a corporate merger situation to the 
extent that the merger creates material changes in the way the companies collect, use, and 
share data. 
 
Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).  Regarding sensitive data, it said: 
 
Companies should collect sensitive data for behavioral advertising only after they obtain 
affirmative express consent from the consumer to receive such advertising. 
 
Id. 
164 United State v. ValueClick, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-01711 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2008), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723111/index.shtm. The action included allegations of CAN-SPAM Act 
violations and of misrepresentations that ValueClick and affiliates secured customers’ sensitive financial 
information.  
   The FTC actions against retailer TJX and data brokers Reed Elsevier and 
Seisint for failing to provide adequate security for consumers’ data demonstrate FTC 
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enforcement of the requirements of Reasonable Security, and Limited Data Retention for 
Consumer Data.165  With regard to the principle of Affirmative Express Consent for 
Material Changes to Existing Privacy Promises, the FTC brought an action against 
Gateway Learning (known for “Hooked on Phonics”) because it rented its customers’ 
personal information to target marketers contrary to explicit promises made in its privacy 
policy, and because, after collecting consumers’ information, Gateway Learning changed 
its privacy policy to allow it to share the information with third parties without notifying 
consumers or getting their consent.166
¶63 In the behavioral advertising dialogue, Representative Rick Boucher of Virginia 
has announced plans to introduce behavioral advertising legislation in 2009.
  The FTC’s action against Sears for its extensive 
behavioral tracking without informed affirmative consent is an example of the principle 
of Affirmative Express Consent to (or Prohibition Against) Using Sensitive Data for 
Behavioral Advertising. 
167  However, 
many have urged Congress and the FTC to postpone legislation and to give self-
regulation a chance to work.  In July 2009, a behavioral advertising consortium 
(composed of the American Association of Advertising Agencies, Association of 
National Advertisers, Council of Better Business Bureaus, Direct Marketing Association, 
and Interactive Advertising Bureau) (the “Behavioral Advertising Consortium”) issued 
Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising.168  These reflect the 
guidelines in the 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report.  With regard to transparency, 
the Consortium provides a two-tier notice system, with a brief notice calling attention to 
the fact that they will be tracking, and with a link to a more detailed policy.  Moreover, 
the Consortium will require opt-in consent for collection of financial account numbers, 
Social Security numbers, and medical and prescription records, and they will not collect 
“personal information,” as defined in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”),169 from children they know are under thirteen or from sites directed to 
children under thirteen for behavioral advertising.  Further, the guidelines also require 
reasonable security and limited data retention, and affirmative express consent for 
material changes to existing privacy promises, as also required by the 2009 FTC 
Behavioral Advertising Report.  As part of the initiative, the Consortium has committed 
to implement 500 million online advertising impressions to educate consumers regarding 
online behavioral advertising over an 18 month period.170
 
165 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Agency Announces Settlement of Separate Actions Against 
Retailer TJX, and Data Brokers Reed Elsevier and Seisint for Failing to Provide Adequate Security for 
Consumers’ Data (Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/03/datasec.shtm.  
166 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Gateway Learning Settles FTC Privacy Charges (July 7, 
2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/07/gateway.shtm. 
167 See Rick Boucher, Behavioral Ads: The Need for Privacy Protection, THE HILL, Sept. 24, 2009, 
http://thehill.com/special-reports/technology-september-2009/60253-havioral-ads-the-need-for-privacy-
protection. 
168 AM. ASS’N OF ADVER. AGENCIES ET AL., SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL 
ADVERTISING (2009), http://www.iab.net/insights_research/public_policy/behavioral-advertisingprinciples 
[hereinafter Behavioral Advertising Consortium Principles]. 
169 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6508 (2006).  Under COPPA, the term “personal information” includes 
individually identifiable information about an individual collected online, including any persistent identifier 
that is tied to such identifying information. 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (2006). 
170 Behavioral Advertising Consortium Principles, supra note 168, at 12. 
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¶64  The Consortium’s Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising 
strikes an appropriate balance at this time for behavioral advertising using non PII, in the 
U.S based on the culture of the Internet as it now exists.  As noted in the New York Times 
interview with David Vladeck, behavioral advertising is an important component of the 
online ecosystem.  The Internet is supported almost entirely by advertising, with online 
businesses being able to provide free content in exchange for online advertising.171
I personally appreciate the convenience that arises from ads that are targeted to 
my specific interests delivered by websites that I frequently visit for online 
shopping. It is also important to note that online advertising supports much of the 
commercial content, applications and services that are available to Internet users 
today without charge, and I have no intention of disrupting this well-established 
and successful business model.
  There 
are also certain advantages to receiving targeted advertisements (especially in contrast to 
unsolicited email, much of which is clearly untargeted).  Congressman Rick Boucher, a 
major proponent of behavioral advertising legislation, has acknowledged the economic 
benefits of behavioral advertising and embraces the advantages to receiving targeted 
advertising:  
172
Furthermore, the FTC has previously recognized that there are tradeoffs.  For example, 
Jon Leibowitz, Chairman of the FTC stated in 2007 that “[b]ehavioral marketing is 
complicated. In some cases the privacy tradeoff may make sense.”
 
173
¶65 A potential problem with self regulation is that unless there are formal sanctions 
available for violations of established guidelines, some companies may be inclined to 
ignore industry guidelines or to minimize their significance.  However, in addition to 
addressing all of the other principles in the 2009 FTC Behavioral Advertising Report, the 




171 See, e.g., HAMILTON CONSULTANTS, ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE ADVERTISING-SUPPORTED INTERNET 
ECOSYSTEM (2009), http://www.iab.net/insights_research/947883/economicvalue; Grant Gross, Can 
Privacy and Consumer Protection Coexist Online?, PC WORLD, July 24, 2009, 
http://www.pcworld.com/printable/article/id,169040/printable.html; Mitch Joel, There’s a Price to Pay in 
Lost Privacy For All That Free Stuff on the Internet, VANCOUVER SUN, July 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.vancouversun.com/news/There+price+lost+privacy+that+free+stuff+Internet/1844090/story.ht
ml. 
172 Boucher, supra note 167. 
173 Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on 
“Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting & Technology” 6 (Nov. 1, 2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/071031ehavior.pdf.  In full, Liebowitz said: 
 
So what should the Commission do? Well, sometimes the answer to problems in 
cyberspace is clear, like in the case of unfair and deceptive nuisance adware. Put the 
malefactors under order. Disgorge their profits. Pass a law giving the FTC the authority 
to impose fines. For behavioral marketing, the solution is not so certain. Behavioral 
marketing is complicated. In some cases the privacy tradeoff may make sense. But one 
thing is clear: the current “don’t ask/don’t tell” mentality in online tracking and profiling 
needs to end. 
 
Id. 
174 Behavioral Advertising Consortium Principles, supra note 168, at 17-18. 
 which calls on the 
Council of Better Business Bureaus and the Direct Marketing Association (which have 
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both successfully handled such regulatory programs) to jointly develop a mechanism by 
which they can police entities engaged in online behavior advertising and help bring 
entities into compliance.175
¶66 On the other hand, it is another matter that businesses are collecting personally 
identifiable offline data and combining it with data understood to be anonymous in order 
to serve ads.  As noted  by the New York Times in its report about Acxiom and Datran 
Media connecting online and offline data: 
  In cases of non-compliance, the FTC and state attorneys 
general will continue to take action against companies that overstep the boundaries set 
out in the FTC’s Principles. 
[C]onsumer advocates say such unseen tracking is troubling. On the old Internet, 
nobody knew you were a dog. On the new targeted Internet, they now know what 
kind of dog you are, your favorite leash color, the last time you had fleas and the 
date you were neutered. . . . 
Datran’s cookies include 50 to 100 pieces of information. Both companies say 
cookie data is anonymous and generalized. Datran and Acxiom then sell 




As these practices becomes more prevalent (or more widely publicized), there is likely to 
be extensive FTC scrutiny of businesses that combine PII offline data with anonymous 
online data. These practices will intensify the behavioral advertising debate because they 
use PII along with non-PII in a manner that has previously been based only on non-PII.  It 
will also raise issues that were addressed in the FTC’s action against Gateway Learning 
for making retroactive changes to its privacy policy.  There will likely be increased FTC 
scrutiny of the privacy policies of those businesses which employ the services of 
companies like Datran Media and Acxiom, to ensure that they have not previously 
committed to not share personally-identifiable information.  Also, the FTC is likely to 
require that companies obtain consumers’ informed express confirmative consent that 
their personally identifiable information will now be combined with the non-personally 
identifiable data, and an opportunity to control such uses. 
¶67 While the Sears Matter provides lessons to businesses, advertisers, and also 
consumers, it also raises a number of unanswered questions which have been discussed in 
this Article.  Some commentators have argued that the FTC action is unprecedented 
because it contradicts court decisions and industry practices, and further that the FTC 
should publish clear rules for how the FTC expects companies to communicate online 
with their consumers.177
 
175 Id. at 41. 
176 Clifford, supra note 18. 
177 See, e.g., Alan Charles Raul et al., End of the Notice Paradigm?: FTC’s Proposed Sears Settlement 
Casts Doubt On the Sufficiency of Disclosures in Privacy Policies and User Agreements, E-COMMERCE 
LAW DAILY, July 7, 2009, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/searsholdings/542583-00006.html. 
  Although the Sears Matter creates some uncertainty regarding 
exactly what will constitute effective online communication, the FTC has provided clear 
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rules for disclosures, for example, in Dot Com Disclosures in 2000. Additional questions 
will be answered as the FTC provides more guidance, or brings more enforcement actions 
against companies that overstep the boundaries.  Although there are gray areas regarding 
which disclosures are material and which should be displayed first in notices, the FTC 
has been very clear regarding its major principles for actions that involve privacy issues. 
¶68 The Sears Matter has been a watershed moment in the behavioral advertising 
dialogue.  As noted, while previously the companies involved in FTC enforcement 
actions for overstepping the behavioral tracking boundaries were new initiatives launched 
by Internet entrepreneurs which seemed to be deviations from more standard Internet 
practices, the employment of similar technologies by a prominent and long-established 
“brick and mortar” retailer signaled that behavioral targeting has gone mainstream.  This 
has further intensified the FTC’s concerns about behavioral advertising. 
¶69 Behavioral advertising is beneficial in several ways, primarily because it largely 
funds the Internet and allows online companies to offer consumers access to substantial 
resources at little or no expense.178  It also is beneficial because the advertising that is 
delivered to consumers is more likely to be of interest to them.179  At the same time, 
behavioral advertising raises significant concerns because of the capacity of online 
technologies to collect and use consumers’ personal information without their 
knowledge.  Recent incidents such as the posting of family photos and details on 
Facebook by the wife of the head of the U.K.’s MI-6,180
¶70 Meanwhile, there has been persistent talk of federal legislation, and Representative 
Rick Boucher has outlined his plans to introduce legislation in 2009.  However, 
legislation would be premature at this time.  First, it is not clear what type of legislation is 
appropriate to regulate behavioral advertising.  For example, although some privacy 
advocates have suggested requiring opt-in consent from consumers prior to sharing of 
non-PII by third parties,
 and Facebook users’ uproar 
when Facebook changed privacy settings indicate that consumers’ seeming unconcern 
about privacy is more likely due to lack of awareness.  The FTC is correct to emphasize 
the importance of ensuring that consumers are educated about the behavioral tracking that 
is taking place. 
 
 
178 See, e.g., HAMILTON CONSULTANTS, supra note 171. 
179 See generally Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis Of Marketing, 2006 WISC. L. REV. 1151, 
1221 (2006) (arguing that consumers need marketing and do not always recognize its benefits); see also 
Jules Polonetsky, Behavioral Advertisers Need to Change Their Behavior, ROLL CALL, June 22, 2009, 
http://www.rollcall.com/news/36108-1.html (encouraging CEOs to fully use personal data to make their 
customers’ online experiences more useful, but at the same time urging CEOs not to use sensitive data, to 
erase long-term data that could be lost or misused, and to consider how to best provide customers with real 
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180 Associated Press, The U.K. Spy Chief Who Loved Facebook: Holiday Snapshots, Family Details 
about Head of Britain’s MI6 Intel Agency Removed from Web Site, CBS NEWS, July 5, 2009, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/05/tech/main5135008.shtml. 
this would not be advantageous.  Particularly in light of the 
studies showing that consumers rarely pay attention to notices no matter how short they 
are, it seems likely that consumers who are asked to consent to tracking will continue to 
blindly click “I agree” without understanding the consequences.  Moreover, an opt-in 
system would likely interfere with the online ecosystem of which behavioral advertising 
is a part, and potentially result in the loss of  free online resources because they are 
funded largely by advertising.  Also, the FTC did not present its final principles for 
behavioral advertising until February 2009.  The Behavioral Advertising Consortium 
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responded in July 2009 by adopting self-regulatory principles that were substantially 
similar.  The Consortium’s principles include an enforcement mechanism to be developed 
jointly by the Council of Better Business Bureaus and Direct Marketing Association 
through which they can police entities engaged in online behavioral advertising and help 
bring entities into compliance.  Since both entities have successfully handled regulatory 
programs before, these principles should be given some time to work. 
¶71 The first goal of the FTC’s behavioral advertising initiative is to ensure 
transparency and consumer control, so that consumers are aware behavioral advertising is 
taking place in order to make choices about uses of their personal data.  For example, an 
educated and interested consumer may opt out of certain uses, or not use particular 
resources for which behavioral advertising may be necessary for economic reasons.  
Consumer education is a major component of this goal.  In light of this goal, the 
Behavioral Advertising Consortium is uniquely positioned to inform consumers about 
behavioral advertising.  The Consortium includes the same companies that have been the 
innovators of the Internet and digital technologies, and that are expert at reaching 
consumers.  In addition, a Washington think tank, Future of Privacy Forum, which is 
supported by some of these innovators, has already embarked on such an initiative with 
the assistance of the large advertiser, WPP Group, to develop privacy notices that 
consumers will read.  As discussed, previous notices guided by federal regulation have 
not captured consumers’ attention.  However, the members of the Behavioral Advertising 
Consortium (and other advertisers like them) possess the means and the motivation to 
really reach consumers181
¶72 These advertisers should be given the opportunity to make a difference in educating 
consumers, along with ensuring that they comply with all of their other behavioral 
advertising principles.  If successful, this may not eliminate concerns about behavioral 
advertising altogether but should accomplish the FTC’s current goals.  In the meantime, 
the FTC, individual companies, think tanks like the Future of Privacy Forum, and 
universities like Carnegie Mellon will continue their efforts to educate consumers.  
Furthermore, the FTC will continue to bring enforcement action against those companies 
which overstep the behavioral advertising boundaries, and will undoubtedly provide 
additional further guidance regarding acceptable notice procedures. 
 and ensure that they understand that they are being tracked 
(along with the reasons why). While some would argue that consumer education is 
contrary to the interests of the Consortium in that consumers that have more knowledge 
of tracking might try to avoid behavioral advertising-supported websites, these 
companies are also the group with the most to lose if behavioral tracking becomes 
heavily regulated and therefore should have some motivation to ensure that consumers 
more completely understand behavioral tracking and the privacy risks involved. As part 
of its initiative, the Behavioral Advertising Consortium has committed 500,000,000 
online advertising impressions to educate consumers regarding online behavioral 
advertising over an eighteen month period.  
 
181 See, e.g., U.S. Patent Application No. 20090265214 (filed Oct. 22, 2009) (Apple Inc.’s patent 
application for an “Advertisement in Operating System” that disables one or more functions of a computer 
device while serving an audible or visual advertisement to the user, and that enables those functions only 
after the user demonstrates that he has paid attention to the advertisement—thereby forcing users’ devices 
to pay attention to advertisements); see also Randall Stross, Apple Wouldn’t Risk Its Cool Over a Gimmick, 
Would It?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at BU4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/15/business/15digi.html. 
